The Effectiveness of Private Enforcement and Class Actions to Secure Antitrust Enforcement by Juska, Z.
Article
The Effectiveness of Private
Enforcement and Class
Actions to Secure Antitrust
Enforcement
Zˇygimantas Jusˇka*
Abstract
The U.S. system has relied heavily on antitrust class actions as a means of ensuring compensation
and deterrence. Although this tool seems sensible in theory, the reality is that it remains highly
controversial. On the one hand, commentators argue that class actions force defendants to settle
cases lacking merit. Even if a settlement agreement is assumed to have a merit, class actions are
accused of doing a poor job in compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. On the other
hand, the proponents of class actions claim that there is no reliable empirical evidence proving
that class action schemes caused negative effects on antitrust litigation. The public debate about
the effectiveness of class actions illustrate the controversial nature of American class actions fairly
well. Therefore, using comparative insights from the predominant controversies, this study will
determine how well antitrust class actions fulfill compensation objectives and to what extent they
can facilitate deterrence.
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Introduction
Private litigation has always played a major role in the antitrust enforcement of the United States. Even
though private enforcement was meant to only complement public enforcement, in reality private
claims far outstrip governmental actions. Private remedies are aimed at achieving either compensation
or deterrence goals. When the American class action mechanism emerged, it became a very potent
fixture to bridge the gap between both objectives. A primary purpose of the class action device is to
enable large groups of victim to aggregate their claims and hence to claim damages or to seek
injunctive relief as a result of the alleged violation. Throughout the development of these sorts of
proceedings, the Supreme Court has given a broad remedial function for class actions to assure that the
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antitrust objectives are achieved. Yet the approach has recently changed in Twombly.1 There, it was
alleged that antitrust class actions can incentivize defendants to settle cases that lack merit.2 Some
critics characterize this phenomenon as a “blackmail settlement.”3 Despite the Court’s criticism, some
commentators argue that the decision has no merit itself: it relies on the “unsupported opinion of
another appellate court judge” and no empirical study was performed.4 The public debate between
these opposing views well illustrates the controversial nature of private antitrust enforcement in the
United States. Ironically, even if the phenomenon of blackmail settlement would be assumed to have
no ground, a series of additional controversies underlie the understanding on class actions, both in
compensating class members and deterring the wrongdoers.
Therefore, this article aims to assess the effectiveness of class actions in securing antitrust enforce-
ment. Using comparative insights from the predominant controversies in the United States, it will
determine how well antitrust class actions fulfil compensation objectives and to what extent they can
facilitate deterrence. A particular emphasis is on cases where plaintiffs suffered harm but the cost of
litigation exceeds the expected award (“negative expected value claims”). Thus, the debate over
compensation focuses on three major controversies:
1. Class members obtain little or no compensation.
2. The compensation mechanism is framed to (largely) overpay attorneys.
3. Class actions do not compensate the real victims.
The discussion on deterrence will analyze one major controversy: that class actions give little or no
weight to deterrence. To give an additional flavor to the debate between critics and proponents, the
optimal deterrence theory will be applied in order to assess the role of class actions in deterring
infringers.
Part I of this article discusses the rationale for private enforcement and class actions in antitrust
enforcement. Part II examines three key controversies underlying the compensation objective in small-
stakes antitrust class actions. Part III considers the impact of class actions on deterring the wrongdoers
(“rational actors”) by applying the standards of optimal deterrence theory.
I. The Rationale for Private Enforcement and Class Actions
in Antitrust Enforcement
The U.S. policy of promoting competition is based on the Sherman Act of 18905 and the Clayton Act of
1914.6 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any agreement in restraint of trade, while Section 2
forbids monopolistic behavior.7 The Clayton Act is far more detailed than the Sherman Act, expanding
the provisions on price discrimination, exclusive dealings, and the ability for individuals to sue for
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Id. at 558–59.
3. See, e.g., John T. Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm’r, Designing a Private Remedies System for Antitrust Cases-Lessons Learned
from the US Experience, Remarks before the 16th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 10 (June 17, 2011)
(stating that treble antitrust class actions “can put tremendous pressure on the defendant to settle a case regardless of its merit,
and can lead to extortionate settlements”); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 843 (1974) (asserting that plaintiffs’ attorneys
are using class actions to “blackmail” businesses).
4. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA.
L. REV. 1, 67 (2013) (noting that the Court in Twombly cites Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 635, 638 (1989)).
5. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890).
6. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1914).
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
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damages.8 At the federal level, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) have the authority to enforce antitrust laws. On the private side, U.S. antitrust law permits
enforcement by victims of antitrust infringements. In enacting the antitrust laws, private enforcement
was meant to supplement public enforcement, which lacks sufficient resources to detect and prosecute
antitrust violations. However, private claims have become much more prominent and far outpace
government claims. Over 90% of antitrust litigation was filed by private plaintiffs between 1975 and
2004.9 More recently, in 2013, it was indicated that 98% of antitrust cases in federal courts were
private actions.10 In fact, private enforcement has become so powerful that private enforcers indeed fill
in gaps of public enforcement of low detection and suboptimal fines.
A. Two Interrelated Goals of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Compensation and Deterrence
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the private right of action under the antitrust laws
serves two purposes: compensation and deterrence.11 As regards the first objective, the enactment of
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts appreciated the compensation role of private claims. In order to
facilitate the objective of compensation, federal antitrust law authorizes the award of automatic treble
damages.12 In fact, treble damages are the only meaningful tool to provide compensation to antitrust
victims.13 However, considering the complexities in compensating antitrust victims, treble damages
are considered to provide only “rough justice” to sufferers.14 Indeed, an overcharge can be so wide-
spread that the estimation of actual harm may be an insurmountable burden.
Another viewpoint holds that private suits are necessary to deter potential wrongdoers.15 This
concept is based on the idea that public authorities have insufficient time and resources to prosecute
all the unlawful conduct and hence private litigators can secure additional layer of antitrust enforce-
ment. Trebling ensures that infringers internalize the sufficient cost of the harm caused by antic-
ompetitive behavior. In that regard, the Supreme Court noted that the “treble-damages provision
wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement scheme,” because the fear
of treble damages creates “a crucial deterrent to potential violators.”16 Moreover and most importantly,
8. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–15.
9. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, Table 5.41 (Antitrust Cases Filed in U.S. District Courts, by Type of
Case 1975-2004) (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412004.pdf.
10. Fed. Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and
Nature of Suit, During 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2012 and 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics-2013.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (indicating that out of 776
antitrust cases in federal courts 762 were private actions).
11. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov.’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (stating that “[the Clayton Act] has two purposes: to deter
violator and deprive them of ‘fruits of their illegality,’ and “to compensate victims of antitrust violators for their injuries”)
(citations omitted); Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575–76 (1982) (asserting that “treble
damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating victims”).
12. 51 Cong. Ch. 647, July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, part 7 (1890). The private right of action provision was slightly modified in
1914 in Section 4 of the Clayton Act; 63 Cong. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 73, part 4 (1914).
13. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (noting that treble damages “would provide ample
compensation to victims of antitrust violations”). For further discussion, see, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Lawrence. J. White,
Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1051 (1986).
14. Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 632
(2010) (citing Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 118
(1993)). Cavanagh provides a monopolization example where the difficulties occurred in reconstructing the “but for” test in
the case LePage’s, Inc. v. 3 M Co., 324 F.3d 141, 164–66 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004)).
15. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S 465, 472 (1982). On this point see, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 246–47 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/
amc_final_report.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
16. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (citations omitted).
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when trebling is combined with contingency fees, the attorney’s incentive to sue is raised to a
maximum: there is a guarantee that he or she will reap a large award if the case is won or settled.
In addition, the one-way-fee-shifting rule and broad discovery rules ensure a plaintiff-friendly climate.
Together, these measures provide the necessary incentives for private attorneys to invest time and
money in prosecuting lengthy, complicated, and expensive antitrust suits (the so-called “private
attorney general”).
In case of a conflict between the antitrust goals, the Supreme Court seems to prioritize deterrence
over compensation.17 One of the notable case was Pfizer v. Government of India,18 in which the Court
ruled that consumers benefited from the “maximum deterrent effect” if trebling was applied to all
infringers.19 The other case is Hawaii v. Standard Oil20 where the Supreme Court ruled that the
Congress’ incentive of trebling encourages potential private litigants to serve as “private attorneys
general.”21 To sum up, the American system can justify the failures of compensation (for example,
undercompensation of class members), given that the primary objective is to deter wrongdoers.
B. The Role of Class Actions in Antitrust Enforcement
In the United States, private actions can be brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class action rule allows to consolidate multiple claims of
victims who allegedly suffered harm from the alleged violation. Throughout the history, the antitrust
enforcement mechanism has relied on antitrust class actions as means of securing compensation and
deterrence. The U.S. Supreme Court held that allowing these claims to proceed collectively enhanced
“the efficacy of private actions, by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources and to
achieve a more powerful litigation posture.”22 Indeed, the consolidation is very effective when anti-
trust infringement causes scattered harm among a large number of injured parties. In turn, it facilitates
economies of scale in relation to the savings in litigation and court administrative costs.23 The actual
benefits of class actions can emerge from two different types of claims.
First, there are classes with positive value claims (“positive expected value claims”). In such
groups, the potential award outweighs the anticipated expenses of litigation even if the plaintiff leads
the case on his or her own. But with larger financial means, the class can litigate in a more efficacious
way by employing more competent lawyers than victims would be able to do in individual cases.
Therefore, the probability of winning the case increases exponentially. The aggregation is likely to also
be beneficial for the defendants, where there might be a series of individual claims alleging the same
injuries. From a practical point of view, the defendant has an easier time in organizing the defense and
investing in winning the sole case.
Second, there is a situation where the plaintiffs suffered a harm but the cost of litigation exceeds the
expected recovery (“negative expected value claims”). Therefore, these claims would not normally
lead to litigation if not pursued by class actions. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, class action
litigation allows for low value claims to be heard.24 In addition, class actions may be the only
possibility to aggregate claims of small worth, especially when suing the wrongdoer individually
17. The priority of deterrence was stressed in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See, e.g., Barak D. Richman &
Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 69, 90 (2007); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1452 (1985).
18. 434 U.S. 308 (1977).
19. Id. at 315.
20. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
21. Id. at 262.
22. Id. at 266.
23. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 284, 295–97 (1985).
24. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
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would not be “economically rational.”25 In the end, class action litigation can be beneficial both for
class members and for private litigators, who perform under a contingency fee agreement. An illus-
trative example:
Suppose that potential antirust victims suffered an average harm of $100 due to a price-fixing cartel. The
resulting individual claims are economically worthwhile, because litigation costs always exceed the
expected award from positive judgment. But if there were 1 million class members, in theory the expected
recovery can be up to $300 million after trebling. Thus, the lawsuit would have significant financial
strength. If we consider that contingency fees range between 20% and 33%, there is great interest for an
attorney to invest in the litigation, since his potential compensation can result in tens of millions.
This example would be very attractive for private litigants if the cartel was discovered by public
enforcers. Therefore, plaintiffs can “free-ride” on the efforts of government actors and use their
findings in a subsequent private litigation. According to some commentators, a majority of antitrust
class actions are follow-on price fixing cartel cases.26
Although class action litigation allows for aggregating lawsuits that would otherwise be financially
infeasible, the negative expected value claims remain highly controversial to this day. The key
criticism is centered on the fact that very few cases go to trial, because defendants are pressed to
settle cases lacking merit.
C. The Major Criticism of U.S. Class Actions
Arguably, the certification is an essential part of the class action lawsuit. For the case to proceed as a
class action, four threshold requirements must be met under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.27 A court must also find
at least one of the criteria listed under Rule 23(b).28 The settlements generally fall into three basic
categories:
 Automatic distribution settlements. Damage awards are automatically distributed to class mem-
bers who do not exercise their right to opt out. Under this settlement category, class members
are not required to submit claim forms so as to receive award. In order to proceed with this
model, the entire class should be precisely identified. The awards are typically mailed to each of
them. However, a substantial number of class members may not cash their checks.29 Therefore,
undistributed funds can be distributed via cy pres process (discussed below) or, in rare cases, be
25. Coleman v Cannon Oil, 141 F.R.D. 516, 520 (1992).
26. See Tiffany Chieua, Class Actions in the European Union? Importing Lessons Learned from the United States’ Experience
into European Community Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 123, 137 (2010).
27. According to Rule 23(a), all class actions have to fulfil the following requirements. First, the class is so numerous that
joinder of class members is impracticable. Second, there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Third, the claims
or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class. Fourth, the class representatives will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
28. In addition to Rule 23(a), the district court must determine one of the findings under Rule 23(b). First, prosecution of
separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
defendant or would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of others. Second, defendants have acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class. Third, there are common questions of law or fact that predominate over any
individual class member’s questions and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.
29. See, e.g., Wystan M. Ackerman, Class Action Settlement Structures, Meeting of Federation of Defense & Corporate
Counsel, 4 (Mar. 2–9, 2013), http://www.thefederation.org/documents/13.Class%20Action-Structures.pdf (last visited
Aug. 3, 2016).
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returned to the defendant. The attorney receives a fee that is proportionally calculated on the
total value of the settlement, regardless of how many victims actually received damages.
 Claims-made settlements. This scheme is utilized when there is no reliable data to list the
identities of victims. As such, class members are required submit a valid claim in order to
obtain award. Typically, the total payout to the class will be smaller than in an automatic
payment settlement and thus depends on how many class members submitted claim forms.
Indeed, there is a possibility that in some cases (for example, when submitting claim form is
cumbersome), only few members will receive compensation. Despite this unsuccessful out-
come, the attorney receives a percentage based on the potential value of the settlement, regard-
less of how many victims submitted a valid claim form. This may lead to an ironical situation:
the attorney’s fee can exceed the actual payout to the class.30 Uncollected funds are rare (only
when issued checks are not cashed) and the surplus is either distributed to a cy pres entity or
back to the defendant.
 Cy pres settlements. There is no direct compensation to class members, but an award is made to
a charitable organization whose activities are as closely as possible related with the antitrust
victims. In order to avoid abusive cy pres distributions, the cy pres relief has become closely
scrutinized by courts.31
Despite settlements being a faster means of solving antitrust disputes, they are criticized for a
variety of reasons. If the certification is formally approved by the court, it is well-established practice
that the vast majority of cases settle.32 The critical understanding of class actions was summarized by
the former commissioner of the FTC, who considered antitrust class action suits “almost as scandalous
as the price-fixing cartels that are generally at issue . . . [the plaintiffs’ lawyers] stand to win almost
regardless of the merits of the case.”33 Similarly, academics argue that antitrust class actions can be
easily brought, but the defense expenses can be significant, and hence to force defendants to pay for
settlement to get rid of the case.34 In other words, the fear of ultimate loss, resulting in huge financial
loss and reputational damage, might press the defendant to settle a class action wholly lacking in merit
rather than to proceed to trial with unpredictable jury verdict. Two factors tend to strengthen this claim.
First, in contrast to the “American rule” where each party bears its own litigation, U.S. federal
antitrust law entitles the prevailing plaintiff to recover not only treble damages, but also to obtain
attorney’s fees as part of his costs of suit.35 This provision is often referred to as “one-way fee
shifting,” because defendants have no right to attorneys’ fees. The purpose of such a scheme is to
encourage the class counsel to invest in private actions (especially for impecunious victims), while the
interests of defendants are not the primary objective (even if they are found innocent). For the
defendant, the only way to recoup his legal expenses is if the plaintiff was sanctioned under the
inappropriate use of Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which regards frivolous or
30. Id. at 8.
31. See, e.g., Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689–90 (7th Cir.2013); In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d
163, 172–73 (3d Cir.2013); Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 434–36 (2d Cir.2007).
32. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 102 (2015) (citing Thomas E.
Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 647 (2006)); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification and Class
Settlement: Findings from Federal Question Cases, 2003-2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 341–42 (2011).
33. John T. Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, Remarks to the Antitrust Monetization Commission, 9–10 (June 8, 2006)
(citation omitted), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/antitrust-modernization-
commission-remarks/rosch-amc20remarks.june8.final.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
34. See, e.g., DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, 58 (2011).
35. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a).
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improper pleadings.36 However, the fact-intensive nature of antitrust actions highly complicates the
task of discovering the violation under Rule 11.37 If the case is settled, the one-way fee shifting is
usually removed in settlement negotiations. In addition, if the class action is dismissed (for example,
in a pretrial stage) or if the plaintiff loses the claim, each party bears its own litigation costs. It
therefore means that defendants would never be recompensed for frivolous lawsuits brought by
plaintiffs.
Second, discovery rules are designed disadvantageously to the defendants due to asymmetric
discovery costs. As a general rule, the parties are entitled to request a broad range of the discovery
material from the opposing party that would reveal the admissible evidence.38 The discovery rules
require a responding party to bear the costs of the other side’s requests. The issue of concern is that
plaintiffs are able to propound extremely broad and burdensome requests without the fear of retaliation
from the other side.39 This is notable because a defendant (for example, a big corporation) routinely
holds a broad latitude of documents and items (hard copies, electronic information, transactions, etc.),
which might be geographically dispersed and dating back a decade or even more. A wide-ranging
discovery usually also involves a significant amount of interrogatories and depositions, thereby cre-
ating a substantial financial burden on the defendant.40 In addition, the defendant receiving a broad
discovery request will be forced to pay close attention to the details of every element, as the disclosure
material needs to be produced in a consistent and organized form.41 In contrast with the defendant, the
lead plaintiff(s) have a relatively small number of responsive discovery material, because the resulting
harm of a class member is usually of low value. As a consequence, the related evidence can be
collected and produced with little burden or expense. Another concern for the defendant is that
plaintiffs might benefit from a tangible discovery (both fact and expert) even prior to class certification
briefing.42 If the case is prolonged, the defendant should take into consideration that the discovery
costs increase in relation with the increase of time lags. Yet it should be stressed that there is a
possibility for a portion or all of the discovery costs to be shifted to the plaintiff if the requests are
unduly burdensome for the defendant.43 However, in reality the defensive counterclaim is very
36. See, e.g., Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 981 F.2d 1510, 1523 (7th Cir. 1992) (the attorney was sanctioned,
because he failed to interview prior counsel and available witnesses).
37. See, e.g., William H. Wagener, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust
Litigation, N.Y.U. L. REV. 78, 1892–93 (2003) (claiming that multifaceted nature of antitrust action makes the application of
Rule 11 very complicated). (Wagener also refers to Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust Litigation, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 1033, 1043 (1993)).
38. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the disclosure for oral and written depositions (Rules 28–32), interrogatories
(Rule 33), production of documents and electronically stored information (Rule 34), and requests for admission (Rule 36).
39. See, e.g., Boeynaems v. LA Fitness International, LLC 285 F.R.D. 331, 334–35, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (stating that plaintiffs
had “very few documents” in comparison with the defendant’s “millions of documents and millions of items of
electronically stored information”).
40. For example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a), a party may serve on any other party up to 25 written
interrogatories. The responses should be submitted within 30 days after service (Rule 33(b)(4)).
41. Wagener, supra note 37, at 1895 (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) that obliges the documents to be produced “as they are
kept in the usual course of business”).
42. See, e.g., ROBERT E. BLOCH & JOSEPH R. BAKER, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING WHETHER AND WHEN TO
OPT OUT OF A CLASS ACTION, 6 (2012), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/40fdd8df-11a0-46f6-8406-
700ac93bc21b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/933b5357-d218-4c4d-b53d-79f275f39f1f/12278.pdf (last visited Aug.
2, 2016).
43. See, e.g., Boeynaems v. LA Fitness International, LLC 285 F.R.D. 331, 334–35, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (noting that “discovery
burdens should not force either party to succumb to a settlement that is based on the costs of litigation rather than the merits
of the case”). Eventually, the Court warranted a cost shifting under Rule 26; thus, the parties had to share discovery costs
incurred prior to class certification. Another example of discovery cost-sharing is Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82772 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 30, 2008).
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complicated. The judge often struggles to screen frivolous discovery requests, because the plaintiff has
the ability to structure an antitrust claim in a way that prevents adverse effects in the future.44
The skeptical view of class actions has been confirmed by judicial decisions as well. Throughout the
history of antitrust case law, the Supreme Court has given a broad function for class actions to secure
the antitrust objectives. However, this attitude has changed in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.45 The
Court asserted that class actions can force defendants to settle cases lacking merit.46 Furthermore, it
was ruled that the judicial system lacks confidence in screening meritless cases.47 A few years before
Twombly, in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,48 the Court stated that
courts are incompetent to manage the daily monitoring of antitrust litigation.49
Despite the Court’s skepticism, Davis and Lande argue that the Twombly decision has no merit in
itself, because there was no empirical study conducted.50 The Court made a modification for pleading
standard (without any reasonable ground) that conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.51 To
facilitate support for class actions, Davis and Lande performed two studies of recent large and
significant antitrust class action cases, combining forty cases in the first study52 and twenty additional
cases in the second one.53 According to the results of the combined sixty cases, the fear of a blackmail
settlement was considered as unjustified alert: a large majority of cases have merit. The main assess-
ment relies on a test of a probability of success: the amount of over $50 million was considered above
the nuisance value of a frivolous case.54 It was found that the recovery was more than $100 million in
60% of cases, while in only a few cases led to significantly less than $50 million, and the smallest was
$30 million. Furthermore, 88% of the cases studied received at least one validation that the plaintiffs’
case was meritorious.55 Moreover, a federal judge approved all the discussed settlements as fair,
reasonable, and adequate.56 In order to reinforce the results, Davis and Lande point to cases where
class attorneys earned praise from judges and therefore were awarded significant amounts in
damages.57
44. Wagener, supra note 37, at 1897 (also referring to Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 638–39 (1989)).
45. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
46. Id. at 558–59.
47. Id.
48. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
49. Id. at 414–15. See also Cavanagh, supra note 14, at 637.
50. Davis & Lande, supra note 4, at 67.
51. Id. at 3 (citing Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for
Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 399–400 (2009) (noting that the “Court arguably modified the
pleading standard without following proper procedure”)).
52. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F.L.
REV. 879 (2008).
53. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private Antitrust Enforcement, Univ. S.F.
Law Research Paper No. 2013-01 (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1961669 (last visited Aug. 2,
2016).
54. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1279 (2013) (in this paper the authors are further clarifying the study on combined sixty cases).
55. Davis & Lande, supra note 4, at 19–21. The types of validation of merits include the following (percentage of meritorious):
(1) Criminal Penalty (28%); (2) Government Obtained Civil Relief (28%); (3) Defendants Lost Trial Related Case (25%);
(4) Plaintiffs Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment or Judgment as a Matter of Law (23%); (5) Plaintiffs Survived
Motion Dismiss (22%); (6) Class Certification for Litigation (60%).
56. Id. at 21–22.
57. Davis & Lande, supra note 54, at 1282–83 (mentioning In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In
re High Fructose Coin Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. Ill. 1996); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust
Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2011 WL 2909162 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011); In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig.,
No. 06-MD-1775, 2009 WL 3077396 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009)).
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The public debate between these opposing views well characterizes the controversial nature of class
actions in the United States. Ironically, even if a settlement agreement is assumed to have a merit, a
series of additional controversies are claimed to occur in class actions: both in compensating victims/
class members and deterring the violators. The purpose of the following study is to determine how well
antitrust class actions fulfill compensation objectives and to what extent they can facilitate deterrence
of antitrust enforcement.
II. A Controversy of Compensation in Small-Stakes Class Actions:
A Perspective of Antitrust
Private antitrust litigation, and especially class actions, is facing broad criticism for failing to
fulfill its compensatory goal. First, victims receive little or no compensation from class action
lawsuits, but the plaintiff bar is overpaid.58 When victims do receive compensation, the distri-
bution of the settlement fund can be financially worthwhile, because the administrative costs
may consume the entire recovery.59 In addition, the class members usually recover only worth-
less coupons, or their award is distributed to unrelated charities.60 As a counterclaim, the
proponents of class actions assert that most criticism has been based on anecdotal evidence.61
In order to contribute to the debate, this article will assess the main controversies. The major
criticisms that have been stated about private (class action) antitrust enforcement can be clas-
sified into three categories.
A. Class Members Obtain Little or No Compensation
According to the critical approach, there is no need to present empirical evidence of the failure of the
compensation goal; it is predetermined that antitrust class actions generate little or no compensation to
class members.62 One of the major issues is that indirect purchasers are prohibited from recovering
antitrust damages at the federal level.63 By prohibiting these actions, the Court prevents a majority of
financial victims from receiving compensation. The overcharge usually causes harm at different levels
of distribution chain. The further down the chain, the smaller the harm is, and thus there are less
incentives to litigate individually. Therefore, it is programmed that many victims will be uncompen-
sated, especially if they are end consumers.
58. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 214 (2005) (stating that “[m]any class
action suits generate substantial fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the
wrongdoing.”).
59. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 682–83 (2010) (asserting that
“issuing them a check is often so expensive that administrative costs swallow the entire recovery”).
60. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531,
554–55 (2003) (noting that “courts often turn to cy pres distributions of part or even all of the funds to worthy causes”).
61. See, e.g., Scott C. Hemphill, Janet L. McDavid, Andre J. Pincus, & Ronald A. Stern, panelists, Roundtable Discussion:
Mark D. Whitener and Andrew I. Gavil, Moderators, 22 ANTITRUST 8, 12–13 (2007) (the former ABA Antitrust Section
Chair Janet McDavid noting that that “[the] issue [of class action abuse] was never directly presented in these cases, but
many of the issues arise in the context of class actions in which the potential of abusive litigation is really pretty
extraordinary”). However, the proponents of class actions critically reviewed this observation, given that any empirical
study was set aside. For further discussion, see Davis & Lande, supra note 4, at 66.
62. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 59, at 678–90 (explaining the determined failures in static injuries because of a widespread
overcharge in consumer cases and in dynamic injuries because of the complicated, if not impossible quantification of the
dynamic efficiency loss).
63. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729–31 (1977) (asserting that indirect purchasers claims based on the “passing on
theory” may punish the defendants twice for the same infringement).
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Indirect purchasers, however, may recover damages in some state law actions.64 But it is highly
debatable whether indirect purchasers have the ability to bring a lawsuit as financial victims. The
potential problems can be well illustrated through the Canadian example. In 2013, the trilogy of the
Supreme Court’s (SCC’s) decisions in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corporation,65 Sun-Rype
Products Ltd v Archer Daniels Midland Company,66 and Infineon Technologies AG c Option Con-
sommateurs67 ultimately affirmed the right of indirect purchasers to claim damages. Despite the new
ability to proceed with class actions, indirect purchasers still face difficulties in proving their harm at
the merits stage. An actual example of the complexity for indirect purchasers is underlined in Sun-
Rype, where the SCC denied the certification of a class action, since there was no evidence that the
indirect purchasers could self-identify. The claim alleged that the defendants engaged in a price fixing
violation of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sold to direct purchasers, and that some of the overcharge
was passed on to indirect purchasers, including end consumers.68 The Court asserted that direct
purchasers had used HFCS interchangeably and indistinguishably with liquid sugar, thus making it
impossible to define which product was eventually sold to indirect purchasing consumers.69 It was
concluded that the evidentiary standard was too high, because an “identifiable class cannot be estab-
lished for the indirect purchasers.”70 The Canadian example clearly demonstrates that identifying and
compensating indirect purchasers of an antitrust overcharge might be very complicated, if not impos-
sible at times.
Even if the real economic victims may be identified, the individual recoveries are usually so small
that the administrative costs tend to consume the individual recovery.71 An illustrative example is the
Augmentin settlement of indirect purchasers that yielded $7.134 million and, as a consequence, sent
notices to 800,000 potential injured consumers of the antidepressant drug Remeron.72 However, only
65,000 submitted proofs of claim, resulting in an average payout of $109. Given that this number
amounts to only 8% of all potential members, the remaining victims, like 92% of the effected con-
sumers “absorbed their losses.”73 Another example is the El Paso settlement of indirect purchasers,
who consisted of 13 million California consumers and 3,000 businesses, in total generating the $1.4
billion value of the settlement.74 Due to the substantial administrative costs, the individual distribution
was financially unfeasible. As a result, it was decided to provide gas rate reductions in California in the
upcoming two decades.75 The most criticized part of the effectiveness of distribution was that the range
of consumers changed dramatically from the time of the infringement and through the rate-reduction
term.76
64. See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–6 (1989) (allowing indirect purchaser actions at the state level).
65. 2013 SCC 57, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 477.
66. 2013 SCC 58, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 545.
67. 2013 SCC 59, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 600.
68. 2013 SCC 58, at 4–5, 33, 64–65.
69. Id. at 65 (stating that it was impossible to “know whether the particular item that they purchased did in fact contain HFCS”).
70. Id. at 80.
71. See, e.g., William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits After the Class Action Fairness Act, in COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? 295 (Stefan Wrbka et al. eds., 2012) (noting that “[i]t is very
often impractical to distribute tiny individual damage awards to consumers at a reasonable cost”).
72. In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig., Nos. Civ. 02-2007 FSH, Civ. 04-5126 FSH, 2005 WL 2230314, (D.N.J. Sept. 13,
2005). For further discussion, see Crane, supra note 59, at 684–85.
73. Crane, supra note 59, at 685.
74. For further discussion, see, e.g., Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement:
Forty Individual Case Studies, Un. of San Francisco Law Res. Paper No. 2011-22, 77–78 (2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract¼1105523 (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
75. Id. at 84–86.
76. Crane, supra note 59, at 686.
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Coupon settlements have been used as another undesirable scenario that fails to provide meaningful
compensation to class members. The criticism has stemmed primarily from the fact that the redemp-
tion rates are very low. For example, in In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litigation,77 the claim
rate was only 0.54%, while the actual redemption was even lower.78 In Perish v. Intel Corp.,79 500,000
coupons offering a $50 discount on microprocessors generated only 150 coupons for class members.
Low coupon redemption rates are notable because the redemption process imposes many restrictions,
so that very few coupons can ever be redeemed. The best illustration was in In re Domestic Air
Transportation Antitrust Litigation,80 where the class action claimed a price-fixing conspiracy. The
settlement provided $50 million in cash, and $408 million was granted in travel coupons. The usage of
coupons, however, had many limitations. First, class members could not sell coupons to brokers or
others willing to purchase them. In addition, tickets purchased with other promotions were excluded.81
Second, the coupons were excluded during the blackout periods, such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, and
New Year’s. Given such restrictions in place, less than 10% of the coupons were redeemed.82
As a counterclaim, the proponents assert that class actions usually result in substantial compensa-
tion to class members.83 For example, the Paxil and the Relafen settlements are taken as examples of
producing significant recoveries for the class members.84 As regards the claims of indirect purchasers,
empirical analysis suggests that the administration costs amount to only 4.1%.85 Moreover, if an abuse
occurs it is mainly the fault of the judges, who should carefully exercise their control. Another
interesting point is that individuals may not receive compensation not because of large attorney’s
fees, but because of inertia.86 Neither critics nor proponents have provided sufficient empirical evi-
dence that compensation issues are (un-)common or (a-)typical. Yet there have been some attempts to
estimate the actual recoveries in small-value class actions.
1. An overview of empirical data on compensation in small-stake class actions. So far, the existing empirical
data builds up to a contrasting view on whether class action litigation and settlements provide mean-
ingful compensation to victims. The discussion below summarizes the findings of the empirical studies
in small-stakes settlements.87 But it is aimed to crystalize the numbers that are applicable to antitrust
cases. The results can be placed in three categories: showing (1) negative, (2) both positive and
negative, and (3) positive outcomes (Table 1).
77. 1983-2-CCH Trade Cas. 65,680 (D. Conn. 1983).
78. See, e.g., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES, 9–40 (Lslf ed., 2016).
79. No. CV-75-51-01 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Co. June 22, 1998).
80. 148 F.R.D. 297, 305, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
81. Id. at 331.
82. See, e.g., James T. Power, Comment: Tearing Down a House of Coupons: CAFA’s Effect on Class Action Settlements, 9 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 3, 910 (2012) (citing Brendan J. Day, Comment, My Lawyer Went to Court and All I Got Was This Lousy
Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act’s Inadequate Provision for Judicial Scrutiny Over Proposed Coupon Settlements,
38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2008); James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443,1446 (2005)).
83. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131 (2006) (telling that a significant portion of a common fund goes to
class members).
84. Davis & Lande, supra note 4, at 46.
85. Davis & Lande, supra note 54, at 1307–08, tbl. 11.
86. Clifford A. Jones, Deterrence and Compensation in New Competition Regimes: The Role of Private Enforcement, in NEW
COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS: SHAPING POLICIES AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS, 177 (Richard Whish & Christopher Townley eds.,
2012).
87. This discussion is well observed by other authors. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at
Compensation in Consumer Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS 4 (2015). In this article, the study of Fitzpatrick and
Gilbert has been expanded upon by the author’s own research.
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The studies tend to differentiate (directly or indirectly) between settlements with automatic distri-
bution and those with claims-made settlement proceeds. Based on these studies, a distinction should
also be made between the “claiming rate” and the “compensation rate.” The claiming rate (CLr)
considers the number of class members who file claim forms to receive payments. The compensation
rate (Cr) addresses when class members receive some kind of compensation, and usually applies to
settlements with automatic distribution.
Table 1. Small-Stake Cases Compensation Data (1986–2015).
Name of the
Study Type of Rate
Number of Class Action
Settlements (available
results) Results
Negative-sided study
Gramlich study Redemption rate of
coupon settlements
12 antitrust cases (10 of
them were consumer
cases)
1) The average redemption rate was
26.3%.
2) In 10 consumer cases the mean
redemption rate was 13.1%.
Mayer-Brown
study
Claiming rate 6 (different areas) Claiming rates were the following:
0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 9.66%, 12%,
and 98.72%.
CFPB 2015
study
Claiming
rate
251 settlements (claim
rates are available in
105 cases)
The unweighted average claims rate was
21%, and the median was 8%. The
weighted average claims rate was
between 4% and 11%.
Both-sided study
Hensler study Compensation rate 2 small-stakes
settlements (out of 6)
1) 35% out of 4 million class members
received an average payment of $5.
2) 90% out of 60,000 received an
average payment of $134.
Pace-
Rubenstein
study
Not clearly defined
(tentatively both
compensation and
claiming rates were
calculated)
1st part: 6 (out of 31
settlements on the
federal docket)
2nd part: 9 (out of 57
found on the websites
of major settlement
administration
companies)
1st part: In 4 “automatic” distribution
settlements, the compensation
fractions ranged from 72% (of 7,400
class members with an average
payout $35) to 99.5% (of 200 class
members with an average payout of
$2,000). In 2 “claims made”
settlements, the claiming rates
ranged from 20% (of 3,500 class
members; average payout $1,000) to
4% (of 1 million class members;
payout of software worth $20).
2nd part: 3 settlements had rates
between 1% and 5%, four cases had
rates between 20% and 40%, and two
cases were above 50%.
Positive-sided study
Fitzpatrick-
Gilbert study
Compensatory and
recovery rates
15 (disputes on bank
overdraft fees)
An average compensation rate is 55%
(in 13 automatic distribution
settlements) and 5% (in 2 claim-form
settlements).
An average recovery rate is 38%
(available only on 13 automatic
distribution settlements).
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Negative-sided category. This category critically overviews the effectiveness of compensation
distributions to class members. The data demonstrates that small-stake class actions fail to
deliver sufficient compensation to class members. The first study was led by Gramlich in
1986 (Gramlich study).88 He studied twenty antitrust settlements where class members had
been paid in coupons, but only in twelve cases was he able to redeem information from the
settlement administrators and the parties. He found an average redemption rate of 26.3%. In ten
settlement cases the plaintiffs were consumers and the average redemption rate was only
13.1%.89 The study did not report whether settlements were distributed automatically, or with
claims-made proceeds.
The second study was done in 2013 by the law firm Mayer Brown (at the request of the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform).90 The results should be approached with caution, because each
law firm has an interest in protecting its own and its clients’ interests. Coincidence or not, but the
claiming rates are far lower than in other studies. Mayer Brown conducted a study of 148 putative class
action lawsuits filed in or removed to federal court in 2009, 40 of which ended in settlements. Of these
40 settlements, the authors found data on distribution (claiming) rates in 6 of them: 0.000006%, 0.33%,
1.5%, 9.66%, and 12%, and 98.72%, respectively. The “astonishing 98.72%,” however, is not repre-
sentative for small-stakes class actions because it involved the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) litigation with an average payout exceeding $2.5 million.91 The final conclusion of the
study was that most class actions are dismissed, and those that settle typically provide few, if any,
benefits to absent class members.92 The authors, however, did not provide any valuable information on
the average payout of these settlements, except for the ERISA litigation. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974
The last study was done by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB 2015 study).93 The
Bureau searched for consumer class action settlements involving financial products between 2008 and
2012. Out of 419 settlements detected on the federal court sheet dockets, the claiming rates could only
be found in 105 settlements.94 The analysis estimated that 11 million class members received $1.1
billion in compensation over the 2008–2012 period.95 In addition, the study reported that an average
claiming rate was 21%.96 Despite being the most comprehensive study so far, it has been strongly
criticized for failing to abide its own stated methodology and for obscuring evidence of huge variation
in claims rates across different case categories.97 Furthermore, the study was accused of presenting a
“rosy picture,” because 21% seems highly unlikely in large class actions where consumers have to fill
88. Fred Gramlich, Scrip Damages in Antitrust Cases, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 261 (1986).
89. Id. at 274.
90. MAYER BROWN LLP, DO CLASS ACTIONS BENEFIT CLASS MEMBERS? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTIONS (2013), https://
www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf (last
visited Aug. 3 2016).
91. See Final Order, In re Beacon Assoc. Litig., No. 09-cv-777, 11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013), PACER No. 77-2. It represents the
Madoff Ponzi scheme: a potentially huge individual claims can be made. In present case, the individual recovery on average
was over $2.5 million. It is unsurprising that 470 (98.72%) class members decided to submit a claim.
92. MAYER BROWN, supra note 90, at 12.
93. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-
study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
94. Id. at 30.
95. Id. at 27–28.
96. Id. at 30.
97. Jason S. Johnston & Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Arbitration Study: A Summary and
Critique, Mercatus Working Paper, 42–46 (2015), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Johnston-CFPB-Arbitration.pdf
(last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
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out forms to obtain award; rather, it likely has to be lower than 5%.98 One of the reasons for the lack of
clarity of the CFPB study is that the reported rates are reflected in an aggregate average.
Both-sided category. This category reflects neutral results, whereas small-stake class actions can both
provide proportionally sufficient and insufficient recoveries to class members. In 1999, Prof. Hensler
and her coauthors (Hensler study) conducted a study where six class action settlements provided
valuable information on compensation, yet only two of them were regarding small-stakes settle-
ments.99 In the first settlement, only 35% (out of 4 million) received compensation with an average
payout of $5. In the second one, over 90% of 60,000 class members received compensation with an
average payout of $134.100 However, it is unclear what proportion of the harm victims received. The
study notes that settlements were distributed through automatic distributions in both cases.101
The second study was undertaken by Pace and Rubenstein (Pace-Rubenstein study).102 The study
searched for distribution rates in federal docket databases and found available information in six
cases.103 In four cases, where the monetary awards were distributed automatically, the compensa-
tion/fraction rate ranged from 65% (of 4,800 class members with an average payout of $35) to 99.5%
(of 200 class members with an average payout of $2,000).104 In two “claims made” settlements, the
rates were far lower than in automatic distribution cases: 20% (of 3,500 class members; average payout
of $1,000) and 4% (of 1 million class members; average payout of $30 in the form of software).105 The
second part of their project sought to determine distribution data from settlement administration
companies. Although fifty-seven class actions were identified, relevant information was detected only
in nine cases.106 Three settlements had rates below 5% (two of which were below 1%), three cases had
claiming rates between 20% and 40%, one was at 35% (with around 1 million class members), two
cases were above 50%, one was at 65% (with 431 class members receiving an average award of
$5,000), and one was at 82% (with 350 class members receiving an average award of $2,600).107 It was
concluded that claiming rates tend to be far lower in cases involving large classes, with the sole
exception of 35% in a case of 1 million class members.108 The Pace-Rubenstein study, however, did
not reveal information about average payouts in each case, nor if distributions were automatic.
Positive-sided category. According to this category, class members receive actual compensation with
high proportional value. The only study that falls into this category was performed by Fitzpatrick and
98. Id. at 43. The authors base their claim on other empirical studies that are also presented in their analysis (also discussed in
this paper): Hensler study and Mayer Brown study.
99. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAINS (2000).
100. Id. at 184, 204–5, 310, 359, 549–50.
101. Id. at 276. In the settlement where only 35% of class members received compensation, payment was automatic for current
and recent customers of the defendant. Others were required to file claim forms.
102. Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action Outcomes? Empirical Research on the
Availability of Class Action Claims Data, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, WR-599-ICJ (2008), billrubenstein.com/
Downloads/RAND%20Working%20Paper.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id. In the first case, the claiming rate was 72% (applied to 7,400 class members), but only 65% (out of 7,400) of potential
recipients actually realized any payment at all, because they failed to cash their benefit checks by the expiration date. A cy
pres recipient received the value of all unredeemed checks in that case, thus resulting in essentially 100% of the fund being
consumed. In the second case, the claiming rate was 99.6%. Almost all (99.5%) members of that class ultimately received
some payment.
105. Id. at 24.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 32.
108. Id. at 32.
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Gilbert (Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study).109 The authors analyzed fifteen class action settlements against the
largest banks in the United States.110 In these cases, the number of class members ranged from 28,000
to almost 14 million, with a mean of 2.1 million. The settlement funds ranged from $2.2 million to
$410 million, with an average payout of $63 million.111 Out of fifteen, thirtee settlements were
automatically distributed, and two of them were claim-form settlements. In these thirteen cases, around
55% of class members realized compensation.112 Contrary to other studies, the authors sought to
provide data on the recovery rates, that is, the money delivered to class members in light of damages
suffered by the class. Accordingly, the average recovery rate was 38% (of all the settlements), and 42%
if two incidentally low recovery rates were not included.113 Notably, the compensation rates were very
low in the claim-form settlements: 1.76% and 7.39%, respectively. It remains unclear, however,
whether the chosen type of class actions (MDL 2036) are the most representative consumer class
actions, and especially in the case of antitrust, as they regard the issues of debit card transactions.
2. The compensation effectiveness: A study of antitrust. It appears that this empirical data covers a large
majority studies that deal with consumer class actions. Given that there are at least 300 class actions in
federal courts alone every year,114 it is incomprehensible that so few studies have been performed to
appreciate the issue. Indeed, there is no possibility to draw evidenced-based conclusions, but the above
data nevertheless provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of compensation. In what follows, the
antitrust litigation cannot be juxtaposed with some categories of small-stake class actions. In some
studies, small-stake class actions were considered even if only few hundreds of victims were included
in the class and the recoveries were very high (see Mayer-Brown and Pace-Rubenstein studies). For
example, the law and economics literature estimates that the average duration of a cartel is around
eight years.115 In the case of antitrust monopolization, the wrongdoer (typically a large corporation)
engages in anticompetitive conduct, and by using its widespread market power harms a significant
amount of consumers.116 Therefore, a typical small-value antitrust class action should meet the
following criteria:
109. Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at Compensation in Consumer Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J. L.
& BUS 4 (2015).
110. Id. at 779. All fifteen cases were brought under Rule 23(b)(3). Thirteen settlements arose in the In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litigation multidistrict litigation (MDL 2036), which was consolidated before the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida (626 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (J.P.M.L. 2009)). The other two settlements derived from related
federal lawsuits that were not part of MDL 2036 (Trombley v. Nat’l City Bank, F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2011); Schulte v.
Fifth Third Bank, 805 F. Supp. 2d 500 (N.D. Ill. 2011)).
111. Id. at 780–81.
112. Id. at 787, tbl. 3. The compensation rate ranges between 37.27% and 70.48%.
113. The significantly lower recovery rates used postcard-sized checks (14.16% and 6.61%, respectively).
114. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 4, 818 tbl. 1 (2010).
115. See Florian Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law, Centre for European Economic
Research, Discussion Paper No. 12-050, 19-21 (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2118566 (last
visited Aug. 3, 2016).
116. See, e.g., CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AM., MICROSOFT MONOPOLY CAUSED CONSUMER HARM (1999) (stating that “U.S. vs.
Microsoft trial leaves no doubt as to the magnitude and scope of harm that Microsoft has caused consumers . . .monopoly
forced consumers to overpay, denied access to new and better products, and stifled overall quality improvements. These
are the classic symptoms of a monopoly, which is so fundamentally abhorrent to the American consumer”) (citation
omitted), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/antitrustpr.pdf. (last visited Aug. 3, 2016); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al.,
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative (1987)
(explaining, for example, Bainian market power and Stiglerian market power that lead to a determined consumer
welfare loss), https://www.justice.gov/atr/monopoly-power-and-market-power-antitrust-law (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
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 The number of potential class members should start from thousands (1,000-9,999) but more
likely from tens and hundreds of thousands (10,000–999,999) or even millions in some disputes.
 The average individual damage in antitrust class actions should be a small-stake and, thus, range
between low ($100–$300) or very low ($1–$100) estimations.
Following this approach, the next point to address is what the compensatory success would mean in
such class actions. Given the fact that a large majority of class actions are settled, the successful
distribution should cover one of the following points (“success presumption”):
1. The actual compensation rate (ACr) is over 40% in automatic distribution settlements. The
following proportion was determined after assessing the feasible sums available to class mem-
bers. These amounts can be estimated when potential costs (administrative costs, attorney’s
fees and the costs related to inertia) are deducted from the actual settlement award. First, it
should be acknowledged that many cases are settled for amounts closer to actual damages
(award < 100%) rather than treble damages.117 However, the compensation objective is highly
distorted if the settlement agreement is lower than actual damages. Antitrust class actions
require significant resources and expenses to elaborate proceedings. Accordingly, an optimistic
empirical study estimates that administrative costs range between 0.03% and 9.25%.118 An
average contingency fees range between 11% and 33%.119 The perceived costs of inertia
include some unpredictable determinants (such as market changes, inflation and, etc.), yet it
would be fair to reserve the proportion of the settlement fund in a range between 5%-15%.120
Even though antitrust cases are rarely settled for higher than actual damages, the pursued
compensation goal should aim for actual damages (award ¼ 100%). Otherwise the compen-
sation model is highly distorted and unjustifiable. Combining the upper limits of the estimates,
the realistic effectiveness rate would be calculated under the following equation: 100% –
9.25% – 33.3% - 15% ¼ 42.5%. Under this approach, at least 40% of the settlement fund
should be available to class members, or that 4 out of 10 class members should be able to
recover the actual harm.
2. The claiming rate is over 25% in claims-made settlements. This is a different category because
claims-made settlements estimate the number of class members who file claim forms to receive
award. Therefore, claims-made settlements reflect the initiative rate that cannot be very high
due the following reasons: (1) the preparation of claim form is burdensome and complicated,
sometimes requiring notarization121; (2) some class members lost their proof of the purchase or
forgot about the purchase. Thus, many class members have a lack of interest in preparing
complicated claim forms for small awards, or they are simply unable to do so in practice. There
is no well-grounded method to ascertain a compensatory success in such settlements. However,
some useful insights may be derived from the Gramlich study that calculated redemption rates
117. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 14, at 644 (“Most cases settle for amounts that more closely approximate actual damages
than treble damages”); DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE: FROM NY YANKEES V. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TO BUSH V. GORE,
1997-2000, 333 (2004) (“Although the antitrust laws provide for treble damages, most price-fixing class actions settle for
some amount less than the actual overcharge”).
118. See Davis & Lande, supra note 54, at 1307–8, tbl. 11. Other commentators are much more critical and regard that the costs
related with antitrust class action may consume a large portion of the settlement award (e.g., Crane, supra note 59). Yet it is
assumed that an optimistic study has ground.
119. See infra Part II.C for a discussion on the average rates of contingency fees.
120. There no evidence-based calculation to set this amount. Yet, the upper limit of 15% seems sufficient to cover the negative
effects of consumer inertia.
121. The U.S. introduced the complex scheme for the claim forms in order to prevent frivolous litigation, See, e.g., Ackerman,
supra note 29, at 5.
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in coupon settlements. Although the report does not provide comprehensive material to set the
success presumption, it is the only research study of claim rates in antitrust settlements. It was
found that an average redemption rate is 26.3%.122 In consumer cases, the average redemption
rate was 13.1%. However, as previously, this paper takes into account the highest possible
(realistic) amounts, even though estimates in consumer cases are lower. For the purpose of this
analysis, it is instructive to set the lowest rate of 25% for the compensation success in claims-
made settlements. There is no claim made that this approach is ideal, but seemingly there is no
alternative approach to define the success rate in antitrust claims-made settlements. After all, it
would be difficult to declare the compensatory award as successful if the compensation is
provided to less than 25% of victims.
The above-mentioned empirical studies estimated the compensation rates concerning how many
members receive compensation (at least some kind), except for the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study. After
filtering irrelevant settlements for a typical antitrust settlement (either the payout is very high or the
class size is very small), applicable compensation rates can be detected in four settlements, and in the
Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study, encompassing thirteen settlements. The first two were found in the Hensler
study: 35% (of 4 million class members; average payout of $5) and over 90% (of 60,000 class
members; average payout of $134). The other two were established in the Pace-Rubenstein study:
65% (of 4,800 class members; average payout of $35) and 35% (of over 1 million class members; the
average payout is not defined). No part of the study sought to investigate actual compensation rates
(Acr), that is, how these payouts fared in comparison to the entire settlement fund. However, it is clear
that compensation rates of 35% automatically fail to pass the presumption test, while the 65% rate is
also unlikely to ensure actual compensation for 40% of class members. This can be explained by
relying on the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study that calculated both the compensation and recovery rates. The
study found that the compensation rate is on average 59%, while the mean recovery rate is 43%.123 As
a consequence, the results fail to pass the success presumption test, since the Acr is around 24% on
average.124 Even the highest combined value of Acr (65% compensation rate and 57% recovery rate)
fails to pass the success presumption test with the result of 39%.125 The 90% compensation rate found
in the Hensler study seems to be the only settlement result that could potentially fulfill the success test,
since it is more realistic that 40% of class members would obtain actual compensation for harm
suffered. However, the 90% is obviously an outlier rate. According to some authors, the rates tend
to get much lower where the case involves thousands of members and the mean award is low.126 As
mentioned before, large classes are very typical in antitrust cases.
From a broader perspective, the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study sends a message to critics that some
consumer class actions are not so ineffective: in fact, they do bring benefits to class members. The
study is nevertheless primarily useful in small-stakes class actions relating to the disputes of overdraft
bank fees, whereas the harm and the extent of that harm can be precisely identified via electronic
services. But the same method is difficult to apply in antitrust cases where the “comfortable” electronic
format is rare. Notably, antitrust offenses are sophisticated frauds that make the quantification of
122. Gramlich, supra note 88, at 262–64.
123. Fitzpatrick & Gilbert, supra note 109, at 787, tbl. 3. The average proportions is not provided, but they can be easily
calculated.
124. In order to calculate the actual compensation rate (ACr), compensation rate (Cr) should be multiplied by recovery rate
(Rr). Therefore, the average ACr ¼ 0.59  0.4 ¼ 0.236 (24%).
125. The highest combined values can be found in case No 8 (Fitzpatrick & Gilbert, supra note 109, at 787 tbl. 3). Accordingly,
ACr ¼ 0.6475  0.5692 ¼ 0.386 (39%).
126. Pace & Rubenstein, supra note 102, at 32 (noting that “[t]he cases with the highest claiming rates had very small class sizes
(a few hundred class members), while those with the smallest distribution rates tended to have class sizes of several
hundred thousand class members”).
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overcharge very complicated even in the simplest cartel infringements.127 In order to calculate an
overcharge, economists should quantify the difference between the actual and the counterfactual
scenario. Sometimes, there is no reliable data to precisely identify victims of overcharge. Thus, the
automatic distribution of settlement fund is unattainable in practice. As a result, claims-made settle-
ments are the second (and the last) option to directly compensate antitrust victims. However, the
comparative empirical results show that the success test fails in this category as well. None of the
studies found results that pass the success presumption, with one outlier in the Pace-Rubenstein
study.128 When settlements use claim forms, the representative rates range between 1% and 15%.
Even in the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study, where two claim forms settlements were analyzed in the context
of overdraft fees, the results were only 7.39% and 1.76%. The next result to the success presumption is
the CFPB study (21%), yet it was criticized for the claiming rate being too high.129 Needless to say, the
extremely low claim rates in the Mayer-Brown study (0.000006% and 0.33%) seem to be possible in
claim-form settlements. In fact, the rates can be very low when class members receive indirect notice
about the possibilities to submit claim form, for example via media advertisements.130 Also, the rates
can be negligible when obtaining the modest award requires producing years-old bills, notarization, or
mailing via postal services.131 To sum up, claim-form settlements are principally framed to under-
compensate class members.
The general conclusion is that antitrust class actions fail to pass the test of success presumption.
Even more disappointingly, the applicable rates are far away from the required proportions to achieve
the compensation objective. Indeed, the compensation goal fails due to the complex nature of antitrust
overcharge. First, it creates many difficulties in identifying and compensating class members. Second,
administrating the case and distributing damages requires significant expenses. Third, settlement
awards are usually very low and typically lower than actual damages. In such circumstances, antitrust
class actions are programmed to provide very low proportional compensation to an insignificant
number of victims.
B. The Compensation Mechanism is Framed to (Largely) Overpay Attorneys
The previous discussion has demonstrated that antitrust class actions fail to accomplish the stated goal
of compensation for class members. This, too, might suggest that the remuneration of the class counsel
should be adjusted accordingly. However, the practice is different.
Judges have a great deal of discretion in how they set fee awards in class action cases. Under Rule
23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judges determine a reasonable fee that should be
awarded to class counsel. Courts typically choose between two methods. One is the percentage-of-
127. Patrick L. Anderson et al., Damages in Antitrust Cases, AEG Working Paper 2007-2 (noting that the overcharge in the
simplest price-fixing violations “is not listed on the invoices nor shown on the accounting income statement.” The author
also stresses that an “overcharge” is typical in price-fixing cases and monopolization, while “loss profit” is usual in
predatory pricing, resale price maintenance and refusal to deal.), http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/portals/0/
upload/doc2066.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2016).
128. Id. at 32. The only case with large class (with around million class members) had more than a tiny distribution rate, i.e.,
35%. The authors accept that this is an exception because the smallest distribution rates typically should “have class sizes
of several hundred thousand class members.”
129. Johnston & Zywicki, supra note 97, at 43.
130. Alison Frankel, A Smoking Gun in Debate Over Consumer Class Actions? REUTERS (2014) (stating that the median claims
rate for cases in the claims administrator (KCC) analysis was only 0.23%) (Aug. 4, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2014/05/09/a-smoking-gun-in-debate-over-consumer-class-actions/.
131. See, e.g., Redmond v. RadioShack, Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2014) (Judge Richard Posner stating that “[t]he fact
that the vast majority of the recipients of notice did not submit claims hardly shows ‘acceptance’ of the proposed
settlement: rather it shows oversight, indifference, rejection, or transaction costs”).
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the-settlement method, according to which the judge bases the attorney’s fee on the size of the
settlement. The other is the lodestar approach, as a result of which the court calculates attorney’s
reasonable fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked for the case by a reasonable
hourly fee.132 Throughout the years, the percentage-of-the-settlement approach (also referred as a
“contingency fee agreement”) has been dominant over the lodestar method.133 Indeed, the percentage
method brings legal certainty and transparency. According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, this
method “align(s) the interests of plaintiffs and their attorneys more fully by allowing the latter to share
in both the upside and downside risk of litigation.”134 On the contrary, critics assert that the percentage
method can yield outsized compensation to the lawyers who bring class actions.135 It should be
stressed that the Ninth Circuit adopted a presumption that 25% is the proper fee percentage in class
action cases.136 If we assume that the fee award is 25% on average, a contingency fee of $2.5 million in
a settlement of $10 million does not seem so significant. But if the settlement award is in the hundreds
of millions, the counsel can obtain very significant compensation. To that extent, the district court
vividly explained that it would be “generally not 150 times more difficult to program, try and settle a
$150 million case than [it would be] to try a $1 million case.”137 In fact, the increase in the value of
settlement depends directly on the size of the class rather than on the quality of counsel’s legal
services. Another concern is that few, if any, class members have an appreciable incentive to monitor
the behavior of the class counsel, because the harm is of low value. Furthermore, class counsel takes all
litigation risks when he or she sign a contingency fee agreement. Thus, the lawyer is empowered to
negotiate the terms of the settlement and to set own fees. It can be argued that there is no feasible
mechanism to monitor attorney’s compensation, unless the judge determines the fees to be excessive
and rejects the settlement as unfair. However, they are often satisfied with the agreed settlement,
because they clear complex antitrust class actions from the docket. But what does the empirical data
tell about the real values that go to the plaintiff bar rather than class members?
1. An overview of empirical data on attorney’s fees in antitrust cases. Like in compensation effectiveness to
class members, there is a lack of empirical data on the attorney’s fees. To my knowledge, there are
three studies that provide handful points regarding attorneys’ fees in antitrust cases (Table 2).
The first case is a study of Lande-Davis that was able to ascertain the attorney’s fee percentage in
thirty cases.138 Accordingly, in cases involving recoveries lower than $100 million, the courts awarded
class counsel a percentage of the recovery that was between 30% and 33.3%, with two incidental
exceptions generating 15% and 7%. For the recoveries between $100 million and $500 million, the
awards ranged between 20% and 33.3%, with a mean of 29.5%. In cases over $500 million, the court
awarded a much smaller percentage of the total settlement value, with a mean 11.1%.139 The study did
not provide the actual average recoveries by attorneys. But this average can be easily calculated, as all
data necessary to make simple mathematical calculations are available. Thus, the mean actual recov-
eries are the following (respectively by the category): $19.1 million, $56.5 million, and $183.3 million.
132. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hughees, 312 F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); City of Philadelphia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co, Inc. 345 F. Supp. 454, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
133. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 114, at 832.
134. See McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2010).
135. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 58, at 214 (stating that “[m]any class action suits generate substantial fees for counsel but
produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing”).
136. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 968 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corporation, 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th
Cir. 1998).
137. In re NASDAQ Market Makers Antitrust Litigation, 187 F.R.D. 465, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Opinion Robert Sweet, District
Judge).
138. Lande & Davis, supra note 52, at 902–3.
139. Id. at 911–12, tbl. 7A, 7B, 7C (overviewing all the results).
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The second study was done by Fitzpatrick, who calculated the attorney’s fees for all 2006–2007
federal class settlements.140 He claimed that (only) 15% of the settlement amount (or $5 billion out of
$33 billion) went to the plaintiff bar in fees and expenses. But the figure for antitrust class actions is
different. First, the mean fees were much larger during the same period, with an average of 25%.141
Second, antitrust attorneys are the best compensated among other subject areas, with a mean of $15.1
million per case. Even in securities cases—by far the most common class actions—the mean is $13.1
million, while lawyers in other fields obtain much lower compensation, varying from $0.11 million to
$2.26 million.142
The third study of Eisenberg-Miller collected data from class action settlements in both state and
federal courts, found from court opinions published in the Westlaw and Lexis databases between 1993
and 2008.143 The study, in essence, demonstrates similar results to the Fitzpatrick study. Eisenberg and
Miller found that the amount of recovery was 22% in antitrust cases. According to the study, the
antitrust attorneys were second best paid ($21.02 million) after the torts ($30.15 million).144
2. The evaluation of attorney’s fees: Risk and reward. The results suggest that antitrust class counsels are
one of the most if not the most well-paid practitioners among all legal fields. No study has yet managed
to draw a line between overpayment and underpayment of attorneys. The above-mentioned data
debates for the percentage of the total settlement. However, the inaccuracies of the percentage method
are well illustrated in the Visa/MasterCard case,145 where the class counsel received around $250
million in recovery, but the fee percentage was only 6.5. Even though this is one of the largest antitrust
cases in history, it does not change the fact that large cases are fixed to overcompensate the class
counsel. Consequently, this article argues that the counsel’s compensation should be assessed under
two key criteria: (1) how much attorneys spend and (2) how much they obtain.
The existing empirical data does not provide the information needed to evaluate the total plaintiff’s
costs in antitrust class actions. Finding this information is probably hindered due to confidentiality
Table 2. An Overview of Mean Attorneys’ Fees.
Name of the Study Number of Cases
Attorney’s Fee Percentage
(average)
Actual Recoveries (average
in millions)
Lande-Davis study 30 antitrust $1<$100 million – 28.3% (16
cases)
$100–$500 million – 29.6% (9
cases)
>$500 million – 11.1% (5 cases)
$1<$100 million – 19.1
$100–$500 million – 56.5
>$500 million – 183.3
Fitzpatrick study 30 antitrust (688 in
total)
22% (no specific separation) $21
Eisenberg-Miller
study
71 antitrust (689 in
total)
25% (no specific separation) $15.1
140. Fitzpatrick, supra note 114.
141. Id. at 831, tbl. 7.
142. Id. The mean rewards represent the following numbers (in $ millions): Labor and employment 2.25, Consumer 2.26,
Employee benefits 2.2; Civil rights 1.1, Debt collection 0.11. The figures have been calculated on the basis of own
calculations.
143. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010).
144. Id. at 262.
145. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa USA & MasterCard Int’l, 396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Davis & Lande,
supra note 54, at 1308; Lande & Davis, supra note 52, at 912, tbl. 7C.
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restraints encompassing the relationship between the attorney and the client. However, this does not
mean that the potential costs cannot be observed. First, in In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation, the
Court approved the attorney’s total litigation expenses to the amount of $2.2 million, including the
attorney’s fees, expert fees, and administration costs.146 Second, defense attorneys report that average
total costs for antitrust defendants range between $5 million and $10 million (even more in some
cases).147 As mentioned before, the plaintiff’s expenses are much lower than the defendants’ (largely
due to broad discovery). Based on these observations, the following study will take into account the
upper threshold of $5 million, which seem to fairly reflect the maximum size of plaintiff’s costs; larger
amounts would equal the defendant’s expenses.
It should first be observed that engaging in class action litigation is a risky step that demands
significant investment, both in terms of resources and time. Indeed, not every action is successful. No
information is supplied about how often attorneys lose. However, the plaintiff bar usually reaps
significant awards. In fact, it is very complicated to define the appropriate risk-to-reward ratio. One
option would be to set a cap that prevents attorneys from receiving too much compensation, but, at the
same time, this cap represents the counsel’s quality and ability to litigate antitrust case that involves
substantial risk. The suggestion would be to limit the award that would be three times higher than the
attorney’s costs. The idea arises from the antitrust rule of automatic trebling, which permits tripling the
amount of the actual damages. To the same extent, the plaintiff’s counsel would be entitled to three
times the costs she or he spent on litigation. It would allow a balance between risk and award: if the
case is won, the class counsel may invest in two subsequent cases of the same magnitude. Therefore, a
balance between costs and award would equal the ratio of 1:3, which could be regarded as a fair
compensation presumption. For example, if the court approves the case costs of $2 million, the
plaintiff’s lawyer should receive $6 million.
However, the current remuneration scheme fails to pass the compensation test. First of all, it should
be observed that contingency fee payments on average range between $15 million and $75 million.148
If the upper threshold of plaintiff’s expenditure ($5 million) is applied, the goal of fair compensation
can be potentially fulfilled in the Eisenberg-Miller study ($5 million : $15 million). Yet it can occur
only in exceptional cases, given that defense costs of $5 million are atypical. In the other two studies,
the compensation ratios range from 1:4 to 1:15. Considering these results, it appears undeniable that
the remuneration scheme is created to overpay attorneys. It is beyond the compensation rationale,
because, as discussed before, class members are highly undercompensated. To sum up, it would be
wrong to say that attorneys are largely overpaid, especially when they take cases that others are afraid
of, but an element of overpayment has been identified.
C. Class Actions Do Not Compensate the Real Victims
When the settlement fund is distributed to the class members, either automatically or upon submission
of claim forms, then victims receive compensation through a direct payment. However, there is a
realistic possibility that settlement funds can be nondistributable or unclaimed by victims. First, a
number of absent class members may not be able to be located, and a further distribution of award is
146. 708 F.3d 163, 11 (3d Cir. 2013).
147. Jusˇka Z. (Jan. 29, 2016) personal meeting with the partners of Schiff Hardin LLP (Ann Arbor office).
148. The lower threshold is based on the lowest amount found in the Eisenberg-Miller study. The upper threshold is based on the
Lande-Davis study that estimates the average payments $55.7 million in the settlement category of $100–$500 and $183
million in the category of >$500 million. Given that there are not many cases in the category of >$500 million, it was
presumed that $75 million would be a fair amount for the upper threshold.
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impossible.149 Second, even when their identities are known, it might be financially unfeasible to
distribute awards to class members, because the case costs outweigh the individual awards.150 Third,
even where direct payments are feasible, absent class members may fail to submit claim forms.151
Concerns surrounding these problems led U.S. courts to introduce the cy pres mechanism that is
used to compensate victims indirectly. Under this scheme, the unclaimed awards are disbursed to cy
pres recipients (usually to a charity) whose activities relate “as near as possible” to the interests of
absent class members.152 While this solution sounds laudable in theory, the cy pres remedy is subject
to much criticism in practice.
The first criticism is that cy pres distribution fails to serve the interests of the absent class members:
the courts approve the distribution of unclaimed funds to cy pres recipients that bear little relationship
with class members who were directly injured by the violation.153 For example, in In re Motorsports
Merchandise Antitrust Litigation,154 a class action suit was brought by NASCAR fans alleging the
price-fixing infringement by vendors of merchandise sold at NASCAR races. The court approved a cy
pres distribution to nine charitable organizations, including the Lawyers Foundation of Georgia and
the American Red Cross, which had no tangible relationship with the absent class members.155 In
another antitrust case concerning a price-fixing conspiracy in the modeling industry, the district court
approved a cy pres distribution to charities with a focus on women’s issues, yet only around 60% of the
class members were women.156
The second criticism is that cy pres distributions create a conflict of interest between the class
counsel and the absent class members. The class counsel’s fee is typically calculated as a percentage of
the entire class award,157 so he or she will be paid the same regardless of whether the funds go to class
members or to a cy pres charity. All the problems encountered are best illustrated in a widely
149. See, e.g., In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12412, 8–10, 20–21, 29 (D. Conn. Oct. 24,
1983) (approving the class of more than 1.5 million Cuisinart purchasers, but less than 1 million received information
about the proposed settlement).
150. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that objectors “concede[d] that direct monetary
payments to the class of remaining settlement funds would be infeasible given that each class member’s direct recovery
would be de minimis”) (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Marek
v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.)); Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here comes
a point at which the marginal cost of making an additional pro rata distribution to the class members exceeds the amount
available for distribution”). For further discussion, see Wasserman, supra note 32, 104.
151. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013) (The Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that “many class members did not submit claims because they lacked the documentary proof necessary to receive the
higher awards contemplated, and the $5 award they could receive left them apathetic”).
152. See Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974). This case was the earliest use of judicial
cy pres remedy in class actions. See also In re Airline Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
unclaimed funds should be distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives underlying the lawsuit,
the interests of class members, and the interests of those similarly situated” (citing In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust
Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 625–26 (8th Cir. 2001)).
153. See, e.g., In re Lupron Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting the failure to
distribute cy pres funds to organizations that “reasonably approximate the interests of the class”); Superior Beverage Co.,
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that the doctrine of cy pres permits for courts to
distribute funds for public interest purposes other than the purposes underlying their claims).
154. 160 F. Supp. 2d. 1392 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
155. Id. at 1395 (explaining that the “[c]ourt has attempted to identify charitable organizations that may at least indirectly
benefit the members of the class of NASCAR racing fans”).
156. Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4911 (HB), 2007 WL 1944343, 36–44 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 5, 2007). For
further discussion, see Wasserman, supra note 32, 120.
157. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Courts
use the percentage of recovery method in common fund cases on the theory that the class would be unjustly enriched if it
did not compensate the counsel responsible for generating the valuable fund bestowed on the class”).
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publicized cy pres distribution in In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation.158 The district court
approved the settlement of the claims for $35.5 million, under which the class members who submitted
a valid proof of purchase would receive 20% of the actual purchase price, and the ones who did not
would receive only $5.159 The settlement agreement was appealed, because it turned out that most
class members failed to submit proof of purchase and therefore would receive $5 each (generating
approximately $3 million), while around $14 million would be paid for attorney’s fees and approx-
imately $18.5 million was reserved for cy pres recipients.160 In turn, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated the lower court’s decision. More specifically, the Court confirmed the issue of the potential for
conflict between the counsel and class members in cy pres distributions:
1. “Cy pres distributions also present a potential conflict of interest between class counsel and
their clients because the inclusion of a cy pres distribution may increase a settlement fund, and
with it attorneys’ fees, without increasing the direct benefit to the class.”161
2. “[T]he current distribution of settlement funds arguably overcompensates class counsel at the
expense of the class.”162
Thus, Baby Products is the best illustration of how the cy pres distribution can bring great rewards
to the class counsel, but many class members remain largely undercompensated. Another undesirable
class action settlement chosen by critics (although not concerning antitrust) is Lane v. Facebook
Inc.,163 in which class members received no compensation at all. The lawyers representing the class
received about $3 million, and $6.5 million of the funds were reserved for cy pres recipient(s).164 There
was no effort made to pay even a portion of the settlement fund to the absent class members. The most
noteworthy criticism this decision attracted was that the cy pres award went to set up a new charity
(Digital Trust Foundation).165 Ironically enough, Facebook’s director of public policy was one of three
directors who ran the foundation, and Facebook’s attorney, together with class counsel, made up the
Board of Legal Advisors. The settlement was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, but not without contro-
versy. Another anecdotal example is Diamond Chemical Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, B. V.,166 in
which the court approved a cy pres award to create the Center for Competition Law at the George
Washington Law School. The proposal was made by class counsel, an alumnus of the law school, who
was later nominated by the law school as a result of the cy pres award.167
These cases clearly demonstrate that abusive cy pres awards occur in practice. However, critics
routinely point to cases that attracted much reproach, but they remain silent as to whether frivolous cy
pres awards occur in a high proportion of cases and whether they are typical. Thus, the proponents of
class actions correctly note that if the figure is only true in 5% of the cases, the critics are overstating
the issue.168 This controversy can be assessed by establishing the presumption of failure, yet this
158. 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (The case aimed to resolve two consolidated collective litigation cases brought against Toys
“R” Us, Babies “R” Us, and manufacturers of baby products).
159. Id. at 170–71.
160. Id. at 169–70.
161. Id. at 178
162. Id. at 179.
163. 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8
(2013).
164. Id. at 817.
165. Id.
166. 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (D.D.C. 2007).
167. See, e.g., Jennifer Johnston, Comment, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is Possible: How Cy Pres Creates Improper
Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 277, 292–93 (2013); Sam Yospe, Cy Pres Distributions in
Class Action Settlements, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1014, 1027–28 (2009).
168. Davis & Lande, supra note 4, at 42.
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approach requires reliance on some assumptions. First, it should be accepted that cy pres distributions
would never be ideal. Second, fraudulent cy pres awards should be prevented from occurring more
often than in incidental cases. Therefore, it seems feasible to establish a 20% failure cap (out of ten,
more than two cy pres settlements are frivolous). While the one-tenth proportional failure seems to be
the norm under the nonenforcement of unjust laws, another one-tenth can be justified due to the
complexity in relating the nature of antitrust infringement to the activities of the cy pres charity. To
sum up, the abusive cy pres awards are confirmed under two conditions: first, the cy pres entity is
created solely for the benefit of the class counsel rather than for the benefit of class members; second,
the money is distributed to a charity that is unrelated to the injured class members. Under such
circumstances, the criticism is confirmed if one or another or both abuses occur in more than 20%
antitrust cy pres cases.
In order to assess the controversy, the study of Redish and two others (Redish study) should be
discussed further.169 The study found that federal courts granted or approved cy pres settlements in
thirty-five cases between 2001 and 2008, and that sixteen settlements can be regarded as faux class
actions.170 Under these type of distributions, the cy pres measure is primarily used for the benefit of the
class counsel rather than the absent claimants. Under such circumstances, there is no intention to
compensate the absent class members. However, it is not defined whether there is a direct correlation
with the unrelated cy pres entity, yet it does not change the fact that attorneys were overpaid in sixteen
(45%) cy pres settlements at the expense of the class. Under the failure test, the abuse numbers should
be even higher. In some cases, the class counsel may be not overcompensated, but settlement funds
may be distributed to unrelated charities.
However, there is no possibility to draw definite evidence-based conclusions from this study alone.
It does gives a preliminary benchmark that at least one-fourth (four cases out of sixteen) of fraudulent
distributions relate to antitrust settlements between 2001 and 2008: In re Airline Comm’n Antitrust
Litig,171; In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig,172 In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price
Antitrust Litigation,173 and Diamond Chemical Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, B. V.174 However, as far
as I am aware, prior empirical studies (including the Redish study) have not examined how many
antitrust cy pres settlements there were between 2001 and 2008. Such analysis would allow for a
comparison of the overall numbers with fraudulent actions. Despite the absence of key data, it can be
argued that there is a high potential for frivolous actions to occur in more than 20% of antitrust cases.
This is notable because antitrust distributions cover the largest portion of announced frivolous settle-
ments, showing that a wide nature of antitrust overcharge is predetermined to attract the most abuse
when settlements take the cy pres form.
D. Synopsis
For the purposes of this analysis, the presumptions of success and failure have been presented.
Following this approach, each criticism has been approved to a greater or lesser degree, and they are
broadly consistent with each other. First, applying the 40% success presumption of the actual com-
pensation rate in automatic distribution cases, it was determined that antitrust class actions largely fail
to provide actual compensation for at least 40% of class members. In claims made settlements, the 25%
169. Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical
Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 3 (2009).
170. Id. at 654–57 (the best illustration is in Figure 2 and Figure 4 of the cited article).
171. 307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2002).
172. 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
173. 2005 WL 1923446 (D.Me. 2205).
174. 517 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D.D.C. 2007).
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success presumption also failed, because the mean rates range between 1% and 15%. Second, the
compensation mechanism is programmed to overpay antitrust class counsel. After the assessment of
the risk-to-reward ratio, it was found that attorneys obtain disproportionately high rewards. However,
large overpayments were denied due the high risk ratio. Third, among all subject areas the frivolous cy
pres distributions are most often announced in antitrust cases. It therefore means that there is a high
possibility that frivolous actions occur in more than 20% of cases. To sum up, the compensation goal in
antitrust collective litigation fails to a large extent.
III. A Controversy of Deterrence
Even if it may sound paradoxical, the failure of the compensatory objective can be justified. Those who
believe in economic efficiency argue that the real goal of small-stakes class actions is to maximize
deterrence.175 The class action device furthers deterrence by aggregating small claims that are too little
to pursue individually. If the suit aggregates claims that might not have otherwise been brought, the
infringer is confronted with the ensured collective litigation and, hence, with the increased magnitude
of the liability. This, in turn, forces defendants to internalize more of the negative effects caused by the
anticompetitive behavior, thereby pushing deterrence closer to the optimal level. Furthermore, where a
large number of victims are automatically included in the class, the collective action alerts the society
about the real value of the harm that is actually caused by the wrongdoer. Finally, by aggregating
small-stakes claims, the class can “exploit the same scale economies as the defendant.”176
The same rationale applies to the cy pres remedy, whereas absent class members usually receive no
direct benefit from settlements. By distributing the funds to charities, the courts ignore the objective of
compensating direct victims. Indeed, the principal purpose is to punish the wrongdoer and therefore to
facilitate the deterrence objective: “[t]here is no indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s
giving the money to someone else. In such a case the ‘cy pres’ remedy . . . is purely putative.”177 Put
more generally, cy pres relief is desirable to force the internalization of illegal gains from the violation.
Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of class action litigation as a means of strengthening
the deterrence of U.S. antitrust rules.178 It is simply considered as an insufficient device to achieve
deterrence. If this conclusion is true, and given the failure of the compensation, class actions would
benefit only the plaintiff bar and thus would be hard to justify. The proponents of class actions, again,
deny the critics’ assertions. In order to appreciate the controversy, the effectiveness of deterrence is
further discussed by weighing both sides in the class action wars. A comparative overview is high-
lighted in Table 3 and further discussed in this section.
175. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little? 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2068 (2010) (“the only
function small-stakes class actions serve is deterrence”); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105–7 (2006) (describing
deterrence as the primary goal of class actions); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 266 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that
compensation should be a “subsidiary” to deterrence).
176. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, Sweetheart and Blackmail Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 4, 1380–81 (2000); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 573 (1987) (claiming that class actions would “substantially diminish the cost advantage
conferred on defendant firms by the private law, disaggregative process”).
177. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
178. See, e.g., Crane supra note 59, at 691–98; Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury:
Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 277 (1998) (arguing that class actions are
used as a weapon to harm competitors).
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A. Low Deterrence Value
The core element of the class action lawsuit is the seeking of class certification. Due to the defendants’
aggressive defense, antitrust class actions may reach the certification stage and be denied on the basis
of failing to meet the requirements under Rule 23. Most importantly, the courts utilize strict eviden-
tiary standards for the class certification in antitrust cases. In the In Re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litigation,179 the 3rd Circuit established that the class certification requires “rigorous analysis” of
factual and legal evidence.180 This examination extends to assessing the testimony of both defendant’s
and plaintiffs’ experts.181 In addition, the standards for meeting the requirements under Rule 23 must
be met by a “preponderance” of evidence, rather than by a mere “threshold showing.”182 Therefore,
there is a high chance that defendants may succeed in opposing the class certification. In such case, the
class action rule serves no use. As mentioned before, if a court certifies a class action, the large
majority of class action lawsuits are settled; very few certified class actions proceed to trial. Conse-
quently, treble damages are typically removed from the negotiation process and, after all, defendants
admit no liability for having violated antitrust laws. From this issue flows another concern: that the
private attorney general mechanism is not the right tool to facilitate deterrence. Lawyers make huge
Table 3. A Comparative Overview of Deterrence Debate Points.
Components of
Debate Low Deterrence Value (critical approach)
High Deterrence Value (proponents’
approach)
Class certification The complicated certification procedure
discourages many class actions.
No counterargument.
Settlement
agreements
Most cases settle—the deterrence value is
low.
Settlement agreements held defendants
liable for approximately $34 to $36
billion. In the same cases, the DOJ
imposed fines of only around $11 billion.
Treble damages Treble damages are typically removed in
the negotiate process of settlements.
The rule of joint and several liability force
defendants to appreciate the amount of
settlement.
Corporations’ liability Defendants admit no liability in settlements. No counterargument.
The relationship
between public and
private
enforcement
Private cartel litigation is mostly followed by
public enforcement. Thus, there is no
deterrence value in private enforcement.
Around half of the alleged cartel
infringements are initiated by private
attorney generals.
The behavior of cartel
managers
Corporate managers are not deterred by
private litigation, because the time lag
between the beginning of anticompetitive
behavior and the judgment is too long.
This period ranges between 5 and 10 years
in an ordinary case, and it lasts over 5
years in settlements.
The most important criteria are the time
lags between each cartel decision until
the judgment.
The data suggests a lag of between 3 and 4
years.
The effects on stock
prices
The filing of a public enforcement action
lawsuit reduces a defendant’s share by
6%, while bringing a private lawsuit drops
it by only 0.6%.
The total 6.6% stock drop is mainly related
with the ensured follow-on litigation
following the public enforcement action.
179. 552 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir. 2008).
180. Id. at 320.
181. Id. at 307.
182. Id.
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investments in antitrust cases and are thus the ones who decide when and whether to settle the case.183
The individual damages caused by antitrust wrongdoers are typically very small, so few if any class
members have an incentive to monitor the settlement negotiations. As a consequence, defendants are
satisfied to “buy off” the attorney in exchange for a favorable settlement agreement.184 The opposite
may also be true: the class counsel may coerce defendants to go into settlements out of fear, regardless
of whether the claim has merit or not.185 Thus, the settled class action lawsuits undercut the deterrence
of class litigation. From a cartel perspective, a majority of class actions follow successful government
actions.186 Consequently, private attorneys use the efforts of public enforcers for their own benefit, for
example, by reducing their own costs in expensive fact discovery proceedings.187 According to this
view, private actions are unable to cure public shortcomings like, for example, a low detection rate.
Another critical argument is that corporate managers (who should be foremost affected) are not
deterred by private litigation. First, the time period between the beginnings of anticompetitive beha-
vior until the judgment is considered the important deterrence criteria against corporate managers. In a
typical antitrust case, the period may last from at least five years to more than ten years.188 It is highly
unlikely that corporate managers and midlevel executives will still hold their positions at the time of
the judgment.189 In case of settlement cases, the early deterrent impact is also improbable, because,
even if the day of judgment is speeded up, the average time from the planning of anticompetitive
conduct to any settlement payout is still more than five years.190 Second, corporate managers are
unlikely to internalize the wrongdoing immediately after launching the antitrust claim. As mentioned
before, empirical studies showed that government antitrust actions reduce the share value by 6% on
average, and filling a private lawsuit by around 0.6%.191 Thus, “[a] half-percent drop in market
capitalization” is highly unlikely to cause negative impacts on corporate managers.192
B. High Deterrence Value
While significant obstacles exist, proponents of class actions continue to claim that private antitrust
enforcement provides meaningful deterrence. First and foremost, the supporters criticize theory-based
183. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. JC Bradford & Co, 827 F2d 718, 727 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that class counsel is the main actor in
the litigation, while the lead plaintiff is put in a passive position. In addition, class counsel is more skilled professionally to
succeed in the certification stage).
184. Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399,
421 (2014).
185. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, The Cost of Suing Business, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 15-19, 10–12, 20–25
(2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id¼2589208 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016); Thomas S. Ulen, An
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Class Action Litigation, 32 EUR. J. LAW ECON., 195–196, 201–2 (2011).
186. See, e.g., Tiffany Chieua, Class Actions in The European Union? Importing Lessons Learned from the United States’
Experience into European Community Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 123, 137 (2010) (stating that
“majority of antitrust class actions are price fixing cases that typically follow a successful case brought by the DOJ or the
FTC through public enforcement mechanisms” (citing Spencer Weber Waller, The United States Experience with
Competition Class Action Certification: A Comment, 3 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV., 210)).
187. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is – and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 6,
2150 (2006) (citing John C. Coffee “No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 435–36 (1981)).
188. Crane, supra note 59, at 691–92 (referring to Federal Court Management Statistics under which the average time from
filing of the case to trial has steadily increased from around 18.5 months in 1996 to 24.6 months in 2007).
189. Id. at 693.
190. Id. at 696.
191. Id. at 695 (citing Kenneth D. Garbade et al., Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An Aggregate and Cross-
Sectional Analysis, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 686, 686–71 (1982); John M. Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Effect of Private
Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm, 85 J. AM. ECON. REV. 436, 437 (1995)).
192. Id. at 695.
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assessments, which are more anecdotal than empirically based.193 The counterargument is supported
by the empirical analysis. A comprehensive study on forty successful antitrust class actions found that
private recoveries are substantial enough to have significant deterrence power.194 Although the study
attracted widespread attention on both sides of the Atlantic,195 it was also the subject of much
criticism.196 In order to reinforce the results, the authors performed a supplemental study of twenty
antitrust cases.197 After the assessment of the total recoveries in sixty private cases through 1990–
2011, the authors made the powerful claim that private antitrust enforcement probably deters more
than the anticartel program of the DOJ Antitrust Division.198 In a comparative context, it was found
that victims received substantial compensation ranging from $33.8 billion to $35.8 billion, which is far
higher than the combined DOJ criminal sanctions (corporate fines, individual fines, and criminal fines)
totaling $11.7 billion,199 or $15.4 billion if the deterrent value of a prison sentence is increased.200
Another study of over 100 international cartels prosecuted between 1990 and 2008 found similar
results: a total of $29 billion in announced private settlements and $7.6 billion for international cartel
fines collected by the DOJ.201 Contradicting to the critics’ claim that class action litigation is usually
preceded by government actions, the study revealed that out of sixty cases, twenty-four were not
preceded by public enforcement, and a further twelve had a different background than government
actions.202 Furthermore, in the first study, only ten of forty private cases were follow-ons to DOJ
enforcement efforts, and sixteen were discovered by private parties.203 This figure, as authors
observed, is consistent with another study, which found that only 20% of private cases were follow-
on cases.204 It may suggest that private cartel enforcement precedes public enforcement as well.
Therefore, the threat of private enforcement might even coerce wrongdoers to confess to the DOJ
through the leniency program.205
193. Davis & Lande, supra note 4, at 7, 41, 43–46.
194. Lande & Davis, supra note 52, at 879–80.
195. See, e.g., ANDREA RENDA ET AL., MAKING ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE EU: WELFARE IMPACT AND
POTENTIAL SCENARIOS, FINAL REPORT (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/
impact_study.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2016). See also Judiciary Committee, Open Access to the Courts Act of 2009:
Hearing on H.R. 4115 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Professor Joshua
P. Davis) (Feb. 1, 2016), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DavisO91216.pdf.
196. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 59.
197. Davis & Lande, supra note 53.
198. Davis & Lande, supra note 54, at 1272; Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315, 315 (2011).
199. Davis & Lande, supra note 54, at 1277 (“[f]rom 1990 through 2011, the total of DOJ corporate antitrust fines, individual
fines, and restitution payments totaled $8.18 billion. Valuing each year of prison at $6 million and each year of house arrest
at $3 million adds another $3.588 billion in total deterrence from DOJ’s anti-cartel cases. This combined DOJ deterrence
totals approximately $11.7 billion” (footnote omitted)).
200. Id. at 1278 (“instead of our assumed disvalue of $6 million for a year in prison, one could use an estimated deterrence value
of $12 million for a year in prison, and $6 million for the deterrence effects of a year of house arrest instead of our $3
million assumption. Doing this would raise the total estimate of deterrence from the DOJ criminal enforcement program
from 1990 to 2011 from $11.7 billion to $15.4 billion.” (footnote omitted)).
201. John M. Connor, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels from 1990 to 2008, AAI Working Paper No.
09-06, 51 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1467310 (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
202. Davis & Lande, supra note 4, 30.
203. Lande & Davis, supra note 198, at 346. Lande & Davis, supra note 52, at 893 (illustrating that $7.631 billion to $8.981
billion came from the fifteen cases that did not follow any government enforcement actions).
204. Lande & Davis, supra note 198, at 346 (citing John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681
(1986)).
205. Cavanagh, supra note 14, at 634 (referring to S. D. Hammond, Acting Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., An Overview of Recent
Developments in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program (Jan. 10, 2005)).
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Furthermore, the proponents assert that critics misrepresent the actual time lags. The most impor-
tant determinant is the time from the latest cartel manager’s decision to continue cartel until judge-
ment. To that extent, the data suggests that the applicable range is less than four years.206 From the
perspective of the defendant’s stock value, it is asserted that private antitrust actions have a far higher
impact than is originally envisaged. Although the filing of private antitrust lawsuits reduces the value
of defendant’s shares on average by 0.6%, the total 6.6% stock drop is mainly associated with the
inevitable private litigation following the government action.207 This is notable because the anticipated
private sanctions are four times as costly as sanctions from public enforcers. There is also a claim that
an average stock drop of 0.6% is surprisingly high, given that government action is typically followed
by private litigation.208
C. The Effectiveness of Deterrence: A Study of Optimal Deterrence
There is no common standard of how to estimate the effectiveness of deterrence. This phenomenon is
interpreted differently by both sides. Critics argue that the complicated certification procedure and the
successive inevitable settlement diminish any deterrence value of class actions. Proponents customize
the criteria of significant financial value of settlements. To give an additional flavor to this debate, the
impact of class actions upon the standards known to the optimal deterrence theory is further examined.
Under this theory, the total amount of the sanctions should be equal to the infringement’s anticipated
“net harm to others,”209 divided by the multiplication of probability of detection and proof of the
infringement.210 The representative equation of the optimal deterrence theory is the following:
Optimal deterrence ðsanctionsÞ ¼ Net harms to othersðProbability of detection  Probability of convictionÞ
The generally accepted view is that cartel managers behave as rational actors who conduct a cost-
benefit analysis in order to see the magnitude of a likely penalty and the probability of being
detected.211 If the sanction is optimal, antitrust violators should be deterred, because the expected
costs outweigh the expected benefits of the anticompetitive conduct. But, in order to define the optimal
sanction, the multiplier should be set for the combined rate of detection and subsequent successful
conviction. The most feasible multiplier appears to be 1/3.212 This proportion comes from the fact that
potentially 1/3 of all cartels (under the most optimistic scenario) are detected.213 When this multiplier
206. Id. at 60 (citing John. M. Connor, Private Recoveries in International Cartel Cases Worldwide: What Do the Data Show?,
AAI Working Paper No. 12-03, 8, 12 (2012)).
207. Id. at 28 (quoting Connor, supra note 206, at 11 (“[O]f the 52 international cartels that were fined by the DOJ during 1990-
2005, 100% were followed up with private damages actions”)).
208. Id. at 29.
209. WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 11–12 (AEI Press 1986)
(explaining the “net harm to others” standard).
210. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983). Landes built this theory
upon concepts developed by Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
211. Int’l Competition Network, Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties, Conference
Paper, presented for the ICN 4th Annual Conference, Bonn, June 6–8, 2005, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/uploads/library/doc346.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
212. See Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16(4) Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 329, 335-337 (2004)
(stressing that the multiplier was determined “without much evidence” but no one can show that the multiplier of 2 or 4 is
possible).
213. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 427, 486-
490, Appendix tbl. 3 (2012) (summarizing the studies and opinions about the probability of cartel detection).
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is applied in the equation of optimal deterrence, the optimal penalty equals three times of the ‘net harm
to others’.
Under the antitrust model, there are at least three interrelated components that enhance deterrence:
corporate fines, personal fines and damages claims. But despite the risk of being punished through the
different layers of the enforcement mechanism, there is no indication that the optimal deterrence has
been achieved.214 This is reinforced by the fact that wrongdoers ‘tend to be recidivists.’215 The major
question is whether antitrust collective litigation pushes deterrence closer to an optimal level. Another
important question is how corporations respond to the threat of litigation in small-stakes class actions.
Indeed, the magnitude of the increase in deterrence depends upon the likelihood of antitrust class
actions increasing the probability of cartel detection and conviction. Another factor is estimating how
the total damages of class action lawsuits may correspond with the ‘net harm to others’. Each of the
element will be discussed in turn.
To start with, it should be stressed that private actions that follow after government actions have
little or no effect on detection. By contrast, stand-alone actions have much higher impact on the
probability of detection. According to the studies of Connor and Lande-Davis mentioned above, a
large share (40%-50%) of private cartel cases are stand-alone lawsuits, while follow-on cases are only
around 20%-30%. Relying on this data, it can be claimed that private enforcement has a potential of
substituting actions of private enforcers. However, this potential applies only to certain circumstances.
According to attorneys, only around 10% of potential class actions are brought by law firms.216
Therefore, private attorneys take low risk cases, while a majority of cases remain unprosecuted. This
is not to deny the reality that public enforcers also take low-risk cases, as many cases are detected and
prosecuted after the leniency program. But this mechanism is the main concern for rational infringers
that cartel violations may be detected.
There is always a potential that a whistleblower (a co-infringer) will report violations to antitrust
authorities. In addition, public enforcers have the enforcement resources that private enforcers lack:
grand juries, lawyers specialized in cartel enforcement, and the support of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.217 It then follows that government actors are able to create a considerable threat at the
time when rational actors perform their cost-benefit analysis. Notably, the personal sanctions (criminal
fines and jail sentences) against cartel managers foremost depend on how active the DOJ criminal
enforcement is. Therefore, the strength of public enforcement is the most important element affecting
rational actors’ behavior. To that regard, stand-alone actions of private enforcers serve only an
auxiliary function to cartel detection.
With regard to the probability of conviction, it mainly relates to the possibility of class actions to be
certified. Even if the lawsuit is brought, its chances to survive through the certification stage is far less
than 100%. During the last years, judges have become more reluctant to certify antitrust class
actions.218 But if the class action is certified, the probability of conviction is 100% or very close to
that proportion, since a vast a majority of class actions are settled.
214. See e.g. Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 443, 470-74 (2006).
215. See e.g. John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern International Cartels 1990–2005, AAI Working
Paper No 07-01, 22-23, Appendix tbl. 11 (2007) (out of 283 modern private international cartels, fixing recidivists were
found in 174 cases. Notably, 11 companies were caught 10 or more times fixing prices).
216. Steven E. Fineman, Guest Lecture Complex Litigation Course, Stanford University (October 2015). The antitrust cases are
brought even less frequently.
217. Bill Baer, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States, Conference Paper, remarks prepared for delivery
to European Competition Forum 2014, Brussels, February 11, 2014, 2, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517756/download
(last visited Aug. 10, 2016).
218. See, e.g. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). For further discussion, see also
Arriana Andreangeli, Collective Redress in EU Competition Law: An Open Question with Many Possible Solutions, 35
World Competition 529, 545-46 (2012).
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Another point regards the impact of class actions on the ‘net harm to others’. The standard
calculation of the ‘net harm to others’ encompasses cartel overcharges and the allocative ineffi-
ciency.219 The potential impact of class actions may include two elements in the context of the ‘net
harm to others’, which is the expected cost of litigation and the final damages after settling. As
regards the first element, the expected costs to oppose class certification, or lead the case after
the certification may be valued in millions (largely due to expensive discovery procedures).
According to the empirical data, the average time to settlement is around 3.3 years.220 It might
demand very high litigation expenses, with the possibility to consume up to $10 million or more
out of the defendant’s pocket.221 If a class is certified, the following response is to estimate the
expected price of settlement. Even if trebled damages are typically waived in the settlement
agreement, it is wrong to assume that the potential value of trebling is excluded in the settlement
negotiation process. At its core, automatic trebling creates a good bargaining position for the
plaintiff. The further assessment of deterrence weighs the components in Table 3 by assessing a
rational actor’s position.
Certification: Given the complicated nature of certification, it is the primary element that rational
agents weigh when conducting a cost-benefit analysis. Another point is to assess the judges’ reluctance
to proceed with certain types of antitrust litigation. Only then may the rational agents assess the
potential risks from settlement.
Settlement: Rational players must have forethought to the probability of conviction being almost
100% when the case is certified, because they will seek settlement, i.e. a lenient form of conviction. In
turn, settled actions have a larger potential to internalize the damages caused due to far higher awards
than government actions.
Trebling: Trebling is very important in negotiating terms of the settlement. However, the impact on
the magnitude of a likely penalty is significantly reduced due to the fact that cases usually settle for
amounts that are more close to actual damages than treble damages. Therefore, there is little prob-
ability that rational players calculate their illegal behavior on the basis of the potential value of
trebling, because it is very rarely applied in practice.
Liability: Defendants admit wrongdoing in settlements, but they usually admit no liability (moral or
legal). Thus, there is no effect on a rational actors’ behavior when they assess the costs and benefits of
the infringement. In some cases, for example in cy pres settlements, the defendants may receive
positive public response due to the significant ‘donation’ to charities.222
The relationship between two enforcement modes: Both enforcement methods take the less risky
cases that have a relatively large chance of success. Yet, public enforcement, with its wide investi-
gation tools, is better suited to detect wrongdoings than private enforcement. At the same time, private
enforcement (especially class action lawsuits) is a more effective tool to increase the significance of
liability when the case is certified.
Cartel managers: The managers foremost engage in a personal cost/benefit analysis of the prob-
ability of facing criminal or monetary sanctions. The data suggests that around 69% of individuals are
convicted in DOJ proceedings.223 Furthermore, there is an existing fear that some corporations might
prefer prison sentences for their own executives rather than giving significant payouts in private
litigation. Thus, the time lags of infringements are not so valuable under optimal deterrence theory,
219. Connor and Lande, supra note 213, at 455.
220. See, e.g. Fitzpatrick, supra note 114, at 820 (also noting that Eisenberg-Miller study found averages 3.35 years in fee-
shifting cases and 2.86 years in non-fee-shifting cases).
221. See supra note 147.
222. Wasserman, supra note 32, at 101.
223. See John M. Connor, Problems with Prison in International Cartel Cases, 56 Antitrust Bull. 311, 43 tbl. 3. (2011) (For the
entire 1990–2009 period the individuals after DOJ proceedings were convicted 158 times out of 228 (69%)).
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because a criminal conviction can follow the manager even if he or she no longer holds the same
position in the corporation.
Stock prices: The total 6.6% drop in share value is an aggregate of both enforcement modes. The
simple model suggests that stock prices are driven by expectations224, thereby suggesting that the
anticipated private litigation may have immediate effects on deterrence. In this respect, it must be
borne in mind that the actual drop of share value by filing a private suit should be higher than 0.6%, but
there is no reliable method to determine the exact impact (proportions) on stock prices.
Based on these conclusions, one could argue that class action litigation extends the deterrence
objective through the prism of optimal deterrence. It is probably true that government actors have more
tools and resources than private litigators to increase the probability of detection. However, it is
equally true that private litigation is more efficient in increasing the magnitude of a monetary penalty.
This is because a class action lawsuit has the ability to aggregate the negative expected value claims,
sometimes totaling in millions of class members. Even if these claims are low individually, the
anticipated aggregate value may push the wrongdoer to internalize the cost of the harm caused closer
to the optimal level. In fact, there is no other tool that could impose the same high monetary value.
Hence, it undeniably appears that achieving optimal deterrence would fail if private litigation, and
class actions especially, were not included in the scheme together with the other two indispensable
elements of deterrence: corporate fines and personal fines. Despite having a high potential to extend
the monetary liability, class action litigation faces crucial obstacles. First, the complicated certification
procedure reduces the probability of conviction. If the class is certified, the case is typically settled for
amounts closer to actual damages rather than treble damages. As shown before, low settlement values
provide low proportional recovery to an insignificant number of victims, meaning that wrongdoers
internalize a low cost for the harm caused. As a consequence, class action litigation is not so efficient in
increasing the level of the ‘net harm to others’ as it may seem from the first blush.
When compared with other two elements, class actions only serve a secondary function in achieving
the objective of optimal deterrence. The crucial point is that government enforcement deter rational
offenders even before they engage in anticompetitive conduct, while private remedies are rather
assessed when the investigation is started or the action is brought to the court. This is because damages
actions are subject to many restrictions, while public enforcement is reinforced by the possibilities of
employing extensive investigatory tools. In addition, criminal prosecution of cartel managers primarily
depends on how effective public enforcement is. Thus, it is perhaps overly optimistic to claim that
‘private antitrust enforcement probably deters more anti-competitive conduct than the US Department
of Justice’s anti-cartel program’225. For private remedies to serve a better deterrent function, and
potentially the equal deterrent function as public enforcement, some amendments are needed. In order
to increase the rate of detection, private enforcers should be provided with additional incentives. One
option may be that public enforcers would provide investigatory support when a stand-alone action is
brought. Another option is to allow a more lenient approach in certifying antitrust class actions.226 In
order to increase the total fine of collective litigation, the settlement awards may be capped for higher
than actual award (for example, requiring to settle for double damages). Hence, it may force the
wrongdoer to internalize the higher cost of the harm caused.
However, this hypothetical scenario cannot be implemented in practice. First, state investigatory
powers will need to support private actions financially and in terms of resources. There is no
224. For further discussion, see, e.g. Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Stock Price Expectations and Stock Trading,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17973 (2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17973 (last visited
Aug. 10, 2016).
225. Lande & Davis, supra note 198, at 315.
226. One example is that flexibility would be given for aggregating different sub-classes.
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reasonable justification for this amendment, since government enforcers lack resources for prosecuting
all potential actions of their own. Second, a robust policy on certification has become a central safe-
guard against abusive litigation. Hence, relaxing certification may exacerbate ‘blackmail settlement’.
Third, capping settlement would jeopardize the free will of the parties to decide on the final outcome of
the case.
Even if we suppose that this hypothetical scenario was implemented, it would not ensure optimal
deterrence. One issue is that there the combined rate of detection and prosecution (the multiplier) will
be enhanced, but this increase should be minimal, and not a ‘game changer’. First, there is no guarantee
that each class will be certified and that each case will collect sufficient evidence for proving damages.
Second, capped settlements may have dissuasive effects for plaintiffs, since defendants may be more
reluctant to settle in some cases, either before or after certification. This is because the ultimate
damages may not differ much from treble damages, for example, if double damages were set. In fact,
capped settlements may reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to sue in cases where early settlements would not
be predicted. In such circumstances, the 1/3 multiplier could be improved only minimally. Another
point is that capped settlements would not ensure the penalty, which would correspond to the required
level of fines: around triple net harm to others. Under the most optimistic scenario, it can be assumed
that double damages will be awarded to class members. After the deduction of case-related costs
(contingency fees, administrative and expert fees), there is a possibility that class members will receive
high proportional awards, or even full awards in some cases. However, this level is far away from the
optimal penalty, which would require to award at least three times of ‘net harm to others’.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that the debate over optimal deterrence theory mainly regards
cartel infringements. However, it does not mean that the private attorney general serves the same
deterrent effects in other type of infringements, for example in case of monopolization. The fact that at
least 90 percent of all federal antitrust cases are private actions is of crucial importance. It therefore
suggests that private attorneys general bring much needed deterrence to antitrust enforcement, espe-
cially when public enforcers have neither the time nor the resources to prosecute all anticompetitive
conduct. However, another viewpoint is that the effectiveness of cartel prosecution is the most impor-
tant determinant factor in assessing the deterrence model. Indeed, hard-core cartels require much more
attention due to their covert nature. If the probability of detection is low, such a system cannot be
considered to provide much deterrence. To sum up, the effective anti-cartel deterrence system should
be a function of three equal components acting together – competition authorities’ fines, private (class
action) damages claims and personal fines. Under the current scheme, however, the private antitrust
remedies are framed to serve only a secondary function.
Conclusion
The primary goal of this chapter has been to determine whether antitrust private enforcement, and
more specifically class actions, accomplish the stated goals of compensation and deterrence. In order
to assess the compensatory effectiveness, this chapter has presented the success and failure presump-
tions. By applying the actual compensation rate of 40% in automatic distribution settlements and a
25% claiming rate in claims-made settlements, it was found that antitrust class actions fail to pass the
defined threshold in small-stakes class actions. More importantly, the class action device is determined
to provide very low proportional compensation to an insignificant number of antitrust victims. This is
notable due to the unique nature of antitrust litigation: widespread overcharge, significant adminis-
trative fees, expensive counterfactual assessments and low settlement awards. Another criticism of
attorneys’ overpayment has also been confirmed. Despite of class members remaining largely under-
compensated, the class counsel usually reaps significant rewards without any connection to the (lack
of) success of the distribution. It was argued that amounts higher than three times that of the expen-
diture costs can be already considered as overpayment. Consequently, the empirical data proved that
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the class counsel typically receives higher proportional compensation, which sometimes can even be a
tens of times higher compensation than the expenditure. In order to appreciate the cy pres controversy,
the 20% failure presumption has been set; that is, if more than two out of ten cy pres settlements are
frivolous. Because of the limited data available, there was no attempt to draw definite conclusions.
However, it was found that dubious cy pres distributions often occur in antitrust cases, suggesting that
a majority of antitrust distributions attract dubious actions.
A crucial point in this respect is that the failure of the compensation goal accelerates the expansion
of deterrence through private attorney general actions. Given that the aggregation of a large group of
victims is allowed without a particular objective to provide effective compensation, and while the
disproportionately high payment is reserved for the antitrust plaintiff bar, private attorneys have
sufficient incentives to enforce antitrust rules aggressively. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the
chapter assessed the elements of controversy through the optimal deterrence theory. It was found that
the DOJ enforcement has more effect on the probability of detection, but the class action litigation
scores higher points in maximizing the monetary penalty. However, the full effect of deterrence is
diminished due to the following factors. First, the courts are reluctant to certify antitrust class actions.
Second, cases are settled for amounts closer to the actual damages rather than treble damages. Third,
class members receive much less than actual damages, meaning that the infringers internalize only low
costs from the harm caused. Due to these obstacles, class action litigation does not deter rational actors
during or before the antitrust violation; it has an effect only when the investigation is started. While the
optimal deterrence should be a function of three equal components acting together—corporate fines,
personal sanction and damages actions—the current scheme only allows for private litigation to serve a
secondary function. However, even if private remedies were enhanced by additional support from
public enforcers, by relaxing rules on certification and by capping settlements for higher than actual
awards, optimal deterrence would not be achieved. It is highly questionable whether attorneys would
bring more cases under the proposed model, as capping settlements may bring dissuasive effective for
attorneys’ incentives to sue. Therefore, the multiplier of 1/3 in detecting and convicting cartels would
remain similar. Another viewpoint is that capped settlements would potentially ensure full award for
class member, but this value is much lower than the optimal penalty, which necessitates awarding the
damages as high as three times of the ‘net harm to others’.
The legal issues and conclusions debated in this chapter should be of particular relevance not only
for the United States, but also for the European Union. The underdevelopment of private antitrust
enforcement has led the EU to facilitate damages actions by adopting the Directive on antitrust
damages actions.227 Critically, only the Recommendation—a non-binding document—was proposed
to facilitate collective actions. However, a binding measure is expected in the near future. The
achievement of objectives in the EU private antitrust enforcement is very complicated, since the
Directive enshrined the principle of full compensation, and deterrence can only be seen as a side
effect. But the US example has shown that the effectiveness in compensating victims cannot be
achieved if there is no strong deterrence. Simply, private attorneys would not be incentivized to bring
class actions.
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